Quantum copy-protection of compute-and-compare programs in the quantum
  random oracle model by Coladangelo, Andrea et al.
Quantum copy-protection of compute-and-compare programs
in the quantum random oracle model
Andrea Coladangelo∗ Christian Majenz† Alexander Poremba‡
October 1, 2020
Abstract
Copy-protection allows a software distributor to encode a program in such a way that it can
be evaluated on any input, yet it cannot be “pirated” – a notion that is impossible to achieve in
a classical setting. Aaronson (CCC 2009) initiated the formal study of quantum copy-protection
schemes, and speculated that quantum cryptography could offer a solution to the problem thanks
to the quantum no-cloning theorem.
In this work, we introduce a quantum copy-protection scheme for a large class of evasive
functions known as “compute-and-compare programs” – a more expressive generalization of point
functions. A compute-and-compare program CC[f, y] is specified by a function f and a string y
within its range: on input x, CC[f, y] outputs 1, if f(x) = y, and 0 otherwise. We prove that our
scheme achieves non-trivial security against fully malicious adversaries in the quantum random
oracle model (QROM), which makes it the first copy-protection scheme to enjoy any level of
provable security in a standard cryptographic model. As a complementary result, we show that
the same scheme fulfils a weaker notion of software protection, called “secure software leasing”,
introduced very recently by Ananth and La Placa (eprint 2020), with a standard security bound
in the QROM, i.e. guaranteeing negligible adversarial advantage.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Copy-protection
Copy-protection captures the following cryptographic task. A vendor wishes to encode a program
in such a way that a user who receives the encoded program is able to run it on arbitrary
inputs. However, the recipient should not be able to create functionally equivalent “pirated”
copies of the original program. More concretely, no user should be able to process the encoded
program so as to split it into two parts, each of which allows for the evaluation of the function
implemented by the original program. Copy-protection of any kind is trivially impossible to
achieve classically. This is because any information that the user receives can simply be copied.
In the quantum realm, however, the no-cloning theorem prevents any naive copying strategy
from working unconditionally, and copy-protection seems, at least in principle, possible. The key
question then becomes: Is it possible to encode the functionality of a program in a quantum state
while at the same time preserving the no-cloning property?
To be precise, we are not satisfied with preventing an adversary from copying the state that
encodes the program (this is certainly a necessary condition), but we also require that there
is no other way for a (computationally bounded) user to process the state into two parts (not
necessarily a copy of the original) so as to allow each half to recover the input-output behaviour
of the encoded program.
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Quantum copy-protection was first formally considered by Aaronson [Aar09]. One of the first
observations there is that families of learnable functions cannot be copy-protected: access to a
copy-protected program, and hence its input-output behaviour, allows one to recover a classical
description of the program itself, which can be copied. In [Aar09], Aaronson provides some formal
definitions and constructions of copy-protection schemes. More precisely, Aaronson describes:
• A provably secure scheme to copy-protect any family of efficiently computable functions
which is not quantumly learnable, assuming a quantum oracle implementing a certain family
of unitaries.
• Two candidate schemes to copy-protect point functions in the plain model, although neither
of the two has a proof of security.
In recent work [ALZ20], Aaronson, Liu and Zhang provide a scheme to copy-protect any family of
efficiently computable functions which is not quantumly learnable, assuming access to a classical
oracle, i.e. an oracle (which can be queried in superposition) that implements a classical function.
We emphasize, however, that this classical function is dependent on the function that one wishes
to copy-protect. In particular, none of the oracles that these schemes rely upon have candidate
realizations in the plain model, and some, in particular, are impossible to realize. For example,
the classical oracle used in the scheme from [ALZ20] can be used to construct an ideal obfuscator
for the function f that is being copy-protected. Such an ideal obfuscator is impossible to realize
unless the class of circuits which are obfuscated is learnable [BGI+12]. Some of the questions left
open in [Aar09] and [ALZ20] are:
(i) Does there exist a scheme to copy-protect any non-trivial family of functions (the simplest
example being point functions) which we can prove secure in the plain model under some
standard assumption? What about larger classes of programs?
(ii) Can such a scheme exist that does not involve multi-qubit entanglement?
On the negative side, aside from the impossibility of copy protecting families of learnable func-
tions, it has remained an open question to determine whether a more general impossibility result
applies. In a recent result, Ananth and La Placa [ALP20] prove that a universal copy-protection
scheme cannot exist, assuming the quantum hardness of the learning with errors problem [Reg05]
and the existence of quantum fully homomorphic encryption.
1.2 Our contributions
In this work, we approach copy-protection from the positive side. Our main result is a copy-
protection scheme for compute-and-compare programs, for which we prove non-trivial security in
the quantum random oracle model. By non-trivial security we mean, informally, that a query-
bounded adversary fails at pirating with at least some constant probability (which is approxi-
mately 10−4 for our scheme).
A desirable feature of our scheme is that the copy-protected program does not involve multi-
qubit entanglement – in fact it only involves BB84 states and computational and Hadamard
basis measurements. This is in contrast to previous candidate schemes for point functions in
[Aar09], whose security is only conjectured, and which employ highly entangled states. The
simple structure of the copy-protected program is advantageous for, e.g., error-corrected storage
of the copy-protected program. We point out, however, that in a practical implementation of
our scheme, where the oracle is replaced by a hash function, evaluation of the copy-protected
program on an input requires coherently computing the hash function in an auxiliary register.
This operation requires universal quantum computation.
Our scheme is not in the plain model, and hence does not fully resolve questions (i) and
(ii). The (quantum) random oracle model, however, enjoys widespread acceptance and popularity
in (post-quantum/quantum) cryptography, and many schemes designed for, and deployed in,
practical applications enjoy provable security in that model only.
Our security definition is essentially analogous to the original definition in [Aar09] but differs
more significantly from the more recent definition in [ALZ20], which is weaker. In Section 3.1, we
give a more detailed comparison of our definition with the ones in [Aar09] and [ALZ20].
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Our techniques and construction are inspired by recent work on unclonable encryption by
Broadbent and Lord [BL19]. The main technical ingredient on which their construction relies
are monogamy of entanglement games, introduced and studied extensively in [TFKW13], which
they combine with an adaption of the one-way-to-hiding (O2H) lemma of [Unr15] for a security
analysis in the quantum random oracle model. In a nutshell, (a special case of) the latter lemma
allows one to upper bound the probability that an algorithm outputs H(x), where H is a random
oracle and x is any string in the domain, in terms of the probability that the algorithm “queries”
at x at some point during its execution. The adaption of [BL19] extends the applicability of the
O2H lemma to a setting that involves two players, and upper bounds the probability that the two
(possibly entangled) players simultaneously guess H(x) by the probability that they both query
at x at some point during the execution of their respective strategies.
Our main technical contribution in this work is that we augment the analysis of this “simultane-
ous one-way-to-hiding” lemma by a search-to-decision reduction. We give an informal description
of this contribution at the end of the next subsection. Along the way, we generalize the analysis
of Broadbent and Lord to certain random oracles with non-uniform distributions.
1.2.1 A sketch of our copy-protection scheme
We start by describing a scheme to copy-protect point functions, which is the crux of this work.
Subsequently, we describe how to extend this to compute-and-compare programs. Our scheme is
inspired by Broadbent and Lord’s unclonable encryption scheme [BL19], which is itself rooted in
Wiesner’s conjugate coding scheme [Wie83].
Let λ ∈ N. The main idea is that it is possible to “hide” a string v ∈ {0, 1}λ by making
λ uniformly random choices of basis (either computational or Hadamard) which we denote by
θ ∈ {0, 1}λ, and then encoding each bit of v in either the computational or Hadamard basis,
according to θ. Formally, this amounts to preparing the following quantum state on λ qubits:
|Ψ〉 =
λ⊗
i=1
|vθii 〉 ,
where |bs〉 = Hs |b〉, for b, s ∈ {0, 1}. Given the string of basis choices θ and the state |Ψ〉, one is
able to “decrypt” and recover the string v by measuring each qubit of |Ψ〉 in the basis specified
by θ. We can bootstrap this idea to copy-protect point functions as follows. Let Py be a point
function with marked input y ∈ {0, 1}λ, i.e.
Py(x) =
{
1 if x = y ,
0 if x 6= y .
Our scheme rests on the following simple idea: we interpret the string y as the basis choice that
“encrypts” a uniformly random string v. The copy-protected version of Py then consists of the
state |Ψ〉 together with some classical information that enables an evaluator to “recognize” v. One
can take the latter information to be H(v), for some hash function H (or a uniformly random
function H, if one works in the random oracle model). Then, to evaluate the program on some
input x, the evaluator attempts to “decrypt” using x as the basis choice, i.e. applies Hadamards
Hx = Hx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hxλ to |Ψ〉, followed by a measurement in the computational basis. Let
v′ ∈ {0, 1}λ be the outcome of this measurement. The evaluator checks that H(v′) = H(v), and
outputs 1 if so, 0 otherwise.1 Except for a minor modification which we highlight in the next
paragraph, this is our scheme (described in detail in Construction 1). We will now informally
discuss the correctness and the copy-protection property of this scheme.
Correctness. Informally, the scheme is correct since “decrypting” using y will result in the
correct string v with certainty, whereas if one tries to “decrypt” using x 6= y, the outcome will
most likely be a string v′ 6= v with H(v′) 6= H(v) (provided H has a large enough range). There
is a slight issue with this approach, namely that an x which is, for instance, equal to y everywhere
1To ensure that the quantumly copy-protected program can be reused, v′ is not actually measured, rather, the check
H(v′) = H(v) is performed coherently (only the result of the check is measured). For details, see Section 4.
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except for a single bit, will result in an honest evaluator outputting 1 (i.e the incorrect output)
with probability 1
2
. To circumvent this, instead of having y itself be the choice of basis for
the encoding, we have the latter be G(y), where G is hash function whose range is sufficiently
larger than the domain2. For the rest of the discussion in this section we will omit G for ease of
exposition.
Copy-protection. The copy-protection property crucially leverages the following property:
it is impossible for any pirate who has |Ψ〉 = ⊗λi=1 |vyii 〉 but does not know y, to produce a state
on two registers AB such that two “freeloaders” Alice and Bob with access to registers A and B
respectively, as well as access to y, can simultaneously recover v. Note that the latter property
crucially holds even when both Alice and Bob are simultaneously receiving y. This property is
essentially a consequence of the monogamy of entanglement. At a high level, one can consider a
purification of the state received by the pirate (when averaging over the choice of v and y). Let
C be the purifying register, which we can think of as being held by the vendor. Since the pirate
does not have access to the register containing the choice of basis y, it is possible to argue that the
only way for the state of register A to allow for recovery of v (with high probability over the basis
choice) is if A is (close to) maximally entangled with C. The same argument applies to B. Hence,
the monogamy of entanglement prevents Alice and Bob from recovering v simultaneously. This
property is captured formally in [TFKW13], via the study of monogamy of entanglement games
(Section 2.2). In particular, a rephrasing of the results of [TFKW13] is that, for any (unbounded)
strategy of the pirate, and Alice and Bob, the probability that both Alice and Bob are able to
output v is exponentially small. Unfortunately, our proof of security does not immediately follow
from the above observations, mainly due to the fact that the encoded program also consists of
the classical string H(v), which further complicates the matter.
Before we expand on the technical hurdles we encounter when proving the copy-protection
property of our scheme, let us first define security in a bit more detail. Informally, a quantum
copy-protection scheme is secure for a family of circuits C (as well as a distribution D over C) if
no adversary consisting of a triple of quantum polynomial time algorithms (P,F1,F2), a “pirate”
P and two “freeloaders” F1 and F2, can win with certainty at the following game:
• The pirate P receives a copy-protected program ρC from the challenger (where the program
C ∈ C is sampled from D). P then creates a bipartite state on registers A and B, and sends
A to F1 and B to F2.
• The challenger samples a pair (x1, x2) of inputs to C from a suitable distribution (which is
allowed to depend on C), and sends x1 to F1 and x2 to F2.
• F1 and F2, who are not allowed to communicate, return bits b1 and b2 respectively.
• (P,F1,F2) win if b1 = C(x1) and b2 = C(x2).
The crux in proving that our scheme satisfies this security definition is in arguing that a strategy
that performs well enough in the security game must be such that F1 and F2 are simultaneously
querying the oracle H at v with significant probability (at some point during their executions).
This would allow to construct a strategy that simultaneously “extracts” v, and thus breaks the
monogamy of entanglement property.
Unruh’s one-way-to-hiding (O2H) lemma [Unr15] is the standard tool to argue the above. One
variant of the O2H lemma provides an upper bound on the probability that an adversary distin-
guishes H(v) from a uniformly random string in the co-domain of H, in terms of the probability
that such an adversary queries the oracle at v. However, in our security proof, this analysis needs
to be augmented: we need to account for possibly entangled strategies that attempt to distinguish
H(v) from a uniformly random string.
• The main technical contribution of [BL19] is an important step in this direction. There, the
authors bound the probability of entangled parties simultaneously guessing H(v) in terms
of the probability that the two parties simultaneously query the oracle at v.
2Such a hash function can, e.g., be obtained using the sponge construction as in SHA3, but by extending the so-called
squeezing phase.
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• The above is not entirely sufficient for our purpose: in our security game, the freeloaders
are not asked to guess H(v), rather they are only required to return a single bit. Note
that an adversary who wins our security game (with high probability) must be able to dis-
tinguish H(v) from a uniformly random string. This is because an adversary who receives
a uniformly random string instead of H(v) cannot do better than random guessing in the
security game. Thus, we need to provide a search-to-decision reduction: an adversary such
that the freeloaders are both able to distinguish H(v) from a uniformly random string (suffi-
ciently well) can be used to construct an adversary such that the freeloaders simultaneously
extract v. This is our main technical contribution (captured by Lemmas 18, 19 and 20).
Naively, the difficulties encountered when attempting simultaneous extraction might seem
somewhat surprising given the fact that the problem is solved by a straightforward union bound
in the classical setting. Indeed, if two algorithms both distinguish H(v) from a uniformly random
string with probability at least 3/4 + , for some  > 0, the probability that the respective query
transcripts contain v is at least 1/2 + 2ε for each of them. This guarantees that both transcripts
contain v simultaneously with probability at least 4ε. For quantum queries, however, there exists
no transcript, and measuring a query for extraction disturbs the run of the algorithms. But the
extraction probability is too small for a union bound even in the classical case, as extraction
requires choosing a query at random, which suppresses the success probability by a factor of
O(qα), where q is the total number of oracle queries, and α = −1 in the classical and α = −2 in
the quantum case.
The dependence of the simple classical technique on query transcripts, and the lack of such in
the quantum case, in some sense capture the essence of a major difficulty we encounter. Let us
therefore elaborate a bit further by noting that the classical technique mentioned above crucially
depends on separate query transcripts for the two players. This implies that it depends on
information that can be elusive in the quantum case, in a very strong sense. Suppose e.g. the two
players share an entangled state (|0〉 |1〉 + |1〉 |0〉)/√2. They proceed by making a single query
each, on input xi controlled on their part of the entangled state being in state i, for two arbitrary
inputs x0, x1. The final state is then
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |x0〉 |H(x0)〉 |1〉 |x1〉 |H(x1)〉+ |1〉 |x1〉 |H(x1)〉 |0〉 |x0〉 |H(x0)〉) ,
where the first, and the last, three registers are held by the first, and the second, player, re-
spectively. At this point, the inputs x0 and x1 have both been queried with certainty, but the
information of who has queried which of the two is, in fact, distributed quantum information in
the hand of the players, precluding any third-party knowledge about it due to the no-cloning
theorem. The difference between global and individual query transcripts also becomes evident
in the recently developed superposition oracle framework [Zha19]. In the described example,
the fact that both x0 and x1 have been queried by somebody can be recovered using the su-
perposition oracle framework. More generally, the superposition oracle framework can be used
as a replacement for query transcripts, sometimes in a quite straight-forward manner (see e.g.
[Zha19, BHH+19, AMRS20, CMSZ19, HI19]). However, the described example illustrates that
recording which input was queried at which interface is incompatible with the correctness of any
quantum-accessible random oracle simulation.
1.2.2 Extension to compute-and-compare programs.
The copy-protection scheme for point functions we described in the previous section can be
straightforwardly extended to the more general class of compute-and-compare programs [WZ17,
GKW17]. By definition, a compute-and-compare program CC[f, y] is specified by an efficiently
computable function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m and a string y ∈ {0, 1}m in its range, where
CC[f, y](x) =
{
1 if f(x) = y ,
0 if f(x) 6= y .
Point functions are a special case of compute-and-compare programs where the function f is the
identity map.
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In Section 5, we show how to copy-protect CC[f, y] in the following simple way: the copy-
protected program consists of (a description of a circuit computing) f in the clear, together with
a copy-protected version of the point function with marked input y. The intuition is that it
is enough to copy-protect the marked input y in order to render CC[f, y] unclonable. At first,
it might seem surprising that one can give f in the clear while preserving unclonability, as the
encoded program now leaks significantly more information than its input/output behavior alone.
However, at a second thought, it is in fact quite natural that one can render a functionality
“unclonable” by just making some sufficiently important component of it unclonable. In fact, it
is straightforward to show that copy-protection security of the extended construction reduces to
security of the original point function scheme.
1.2.3 Secure software leasing
On top of proving the impossibility of a general copy-protection scheme for all unlearnable func-
tions, Ananth and La Placa introduce in [ALP20] a weaker notion of copy-protection, which they
call “secure software leasing” (SSL). The sense in which the latter is weaker than copy-protection
is that one assumes that the freeloaders F1 and F2 (now a single adversary) are limited to per-
forming the honest evaluation procedure only. Rather than emphasizing the impossibility of
simultaneous evaluation on inputs chosen by a challenger, SSL captures the essence of quantum
copy-protection in the following scenario. An authority (the lessor) wishes to lease a copy ρC of a
classical circuit C ∈ C to a user (the lessee) who is supposed to return back ρC at a later point in
time, as specified by the lease agreement. Once the supposed copy is returned and verified by the
lessor, the security property requires that the adversary can no longer compute C. More formally,
no adversary should be able to produce a (possibly entangled) quantum state such that:
• One half of the state is deemed valid by the lessor, once it is returned.
• The other half can be used to honestly evaluate C on every input of the adversary’s choosing.
Surprisingly, Ananth and La Placa were able to show in [ALP20] that a general SSL scheme is
also impossible, despite having weaker security requirements compared to copy-protection. On
the positive side, the authors describe an SSL scheme for general evasive circuits assuming the
existence of subspace-hiding obfuscators [Zha17] and the quantum hardness of the learning with
errors problem [Reg05]. Because subspace-hiding obfuscators are currently only known to exist
under indistinguishability obfuscation [Zha17, SW13], the same applies to the security of the
scheme proposed in [ALP20].
Our work: SSL revisited. As we mentioned earlier, the original definition of secure software
leasing in [ALP20] is a weaker version of copy-protection in the following two ways:
• The lessor performs a prescribed verification procedure on a register returned by the lessee.
• The lessee is required to perform the honest evaluation procedure with respect to any post-
verification registers in the lessee’s possession.
We revisit the notion of secure software leasing from a similar perspective as in our copy-
protection definition. Our main contributions are the following. First, we introduce a new and
intuitive SSL definition (Section 6) by means of a cryptographic security game which does not
limit the adversary to performing the honest evaluation on any post-verification registers.3 Our
definition remains faithful to the idea of SSL, while at the same time offering a stronger se-
curity guarantee. Second, we show that our definition of security is achievable with a stan-
dard negligible security bound in the quantum random oracle model for the class of compute-
and-compare programs (Section 6). Our SSL scheme (Construction 4) is virtually equivalent to
our copy-protection scheme, but is adapted to the syntax of SSL. Informally, any SSL scheme
(SSL.Gen, SSL.Lease, SSL.Eval, SSL.Verify) according to our definition should satisfy the following
property. After receiving a leased copy of a classical circuit C, denoted by ρC (and generated
using SSL.Lease), and a circuit for SSL.Eval, no adversary should be able to produce a (possibly
entangled) quantum state σ on two registers R1 and R2 such that:
3The SSL definition in [ALP20] is not “operational” and cannot be directly phrased as a security game.
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• SSL.Verify deems the contents of register R1 of σR1R2 to be valid, and
• the adversary can predict the output of circuit C (on challenge inputs chosen by the lessor)
using an arbitrary measurement of the post-verification state in register R2.
In Section 6 we show the following key property about our SSL scheme in Construction 4: once a
leased copy is successfully returned to the lessor, no adversary can distinguish the marked input
of a compute-and-compare program from a random (non-marked) input with probability better
than 1/2, except for a negligible advantage (in the security parameter). Our scheme can thus be
thought of as having perfect security for a natural choice of “input challenge distribution”. The
result follows from a standard application of the O2H lemma and a custom “uncertainty relation”
variant of the monogamy of entanglement property which appeared in a work of Unruh [Unr15].
The latter appears in similar contexts in the quantum key-distribution literature. Note that the
technical complications arising in the proof of security of our original copy-protection scheme do
not appear in the SSL security proof. Crucially, this is because we can leverage the fact that the
lessor is performing a prescribed verification procedure.
1.3 Related work
Obfuscation. Copy-protection is related to program obfuscation [BGI+12, AF16], although
the extent to which they relate to each other is still unclear. It seems plausible that some degree
of “obfuscation” is necessary in order to prevent a pirate from copying a program. A natural
question is whether there exist schemes that satisfy both notions simultaneously.
We give an affirmative answer to this question by showing that our quantum copy-protection
scheme for point functions (Construction 1) also satisfies the notion of quantum virtual-black
box (VBB) obfuscation [AF16]. This results in the first provably secure scheme which is simul-
taneously a quantum copy-protection scheme as well as a quantum obfuscation scheme, in the
quantum random oracle model. The main idea is the following: any computationally bounded
adversary cannot distinguish between
(
(
⊗
i |vθii 〉), H(v)
)
and
(
(
⊗
i |vθii 〉), z
)
, where z is a uni-
formly random string of the same size as H(v), unless the adversary queries the oracle at v, which
can only happen with negligible probability. Notice that, when averaging over H, v, θ and z, the
state
(
(
⊗
i |vθii 〉), z
)
is maximally mixed. Thus, the copy-protected program is computationally
indistinguishable from a maximally mixed state. We give a detailed proof in Section 4.2.
Conversely, there exist, of course, program obfuscation schemes which are not copy-protection
schemes (since obfuscators for certain classes of programs are possible classically, while copy-
protection schemes are impossible). Moreover, Aaronson [Aar09] previously observed that any
family of learnable programs cannot be copy-protected: access to a copy-protected program (and
hence its input-output behaviour) allows the user to recover the classical description of the pro-
gram itself, which can be copied. But for precisely the same reason, learnable programs can be
VBB obfuscated by definition.
Finally, we also provide a missing piece that allows us to separate the notions of quantum
copy-protection and quantum VBB obfuscation (Figure 1). Namely, we show that there exists
a provably secure scheme (Construction 2) to copy-protect compute-and-compare programs (in
the quantum random oracle model) that does not, in general, satisfy the notion of quantum
VBB obfuscation (this follows easily in the case when f comes from an ensemble that is not VBB
obfuscatable). Our construction suggests that it is sometimes safe to publish parts of the program
that is being copy-protected in the clear, as long as some crucial components are still “obfuscated”.
In conclusion, we find that obfuscation and copy-protection are, in general, incomparable
functionalities. We point out, however, that obfuscators have so far been employed in all proposed
constructions of quantum copy-protection schemes, such as in [Aar09, ALZ20], as well as in our
scheme of Construction 1 (note that publishing H(v) for a random oracle H is an ideal obfuscator
for the point function with marked input v).
Unclonable encryption. This cryptographic functionality was formalized recently by Broad-
bent and Lord [BL19], and informally introduced earlier by Gottesman [Got03]. In an unclonable
encryption scheme, one encrypts a classical message in a quantum ciphertext, in such a way that
the latter cannot be processed and split into two parts, each of which, together with a classical
8
Quantum copy-protection
•
Constr. 2
•
Constr. 1
Quantum obfuscation
learnable
programs
Figure 1: Separation between quantum copy-protection and quantum VBB obfuscation.
Construction 1 features a quantum copy-protection scheme for point functions which satisfies both
notions, while our second scheme for compute-and-compare programs in Construction 2 does not
satisfy the notion of quantum VBB obfuscation.
secret key, enables decryption. The setting of unclonable encryption is very similar to that of
copy-protection, the main difference being that there is no “functionality” associated to the quan-
tum ciphertext, other than it being used for recovering the encrypted message. As we mentioned
earlier, our copy-protection scheme is inspired by the unclonable encryption scheme in [BL19],
and our analysis extends some of the techniques developed there.
Revocable quantum timed-release encryption. Timed-release encryption (also known
as time-lock puzzles) is an encryption scheme that allows a recipient to decrypt only after a
specified amount time, say T , has passed. Unruh [Unr15] gave the first quantum timed-release
encryption scheme that is “revocable” in the sense that a user can return the timed-release en-
cryption before time T , thereby losing all access to the data. It is easy to see that this notion is
impossible to achieve classically for precisely the same reason copy-protection is impossible: any
adversary can simply generate copies of the classical ciphertext or source code, respectively. From
a technical point of view, revocable quantum timed-release encryption shares many similarities
with the notion of “secure software leasing” in [ALP20]. Besides the fact that the former encodes
a plaintext and the latter encodes a program, the security property essentially remains the same:
once a quantum state is returned and successfully verified, the user is supposed to lose all relevant
information. Our proof of security for the SSL scheme in Construction 3 is inspired by Unruh’s
proof for revocable one-way timed-release quantum encryption in [Unr15].
1.4 Open questions
Our work is the first to construct a copy-protection scheme in a standard cryptographic model
(the QROM) with non-trivial security against malicious adversaries. It leaves several questions
open. The most pressing ones are the following.
• First of all, our security guarantee is very weak: it only ensures that no adversary can win
with probability more than 1 − δ, for a very small constant δ (approximately 10−4). Is it
possible to boost the security to ensure negligible advantage? (The main technical hurdle
seems to be the factor of 9 in the bound of Lemma 19.)
• Another open problem concerns upgrading security in a different way, by providing the pirate
with k copy-protected copies of a program and asking them to satisfy k+ 1 freeloaders. We
believe that our scheme can achieve such a notion, but with a security that becomes worse
as k grows. Providing a scheme where security does not depend on k is an interesting open
question.
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• Finally, is it possible to remove the requirement of a random oracle, and to achieve a scheme
with non-trivial security against malicious adversary in the plain model? We think that this
would require fundamentally different techniques.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and background
Basic notation. For n,m ∈ N, we denote the set of all functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, as
Bool(n,m). The notation x ← {0, 1}n denotes sampling an element x uniformly at random in
{0, 1}n, whereas x← D denotes sampling of an element x from a distribution D. We denote the
expectation value of a random variable X by E[X] =
∑
x xPr[X = x]. We call a non-negative
real-valued function µ : N → R+ negligible if µ(n) = o(1/p(n)), for every polynomial p(n). The
min-entropy of a random variable X is defined as Hmin(X) = − log(maxx Pr[X = x]). The con-
ditional min-entropy of a random variable X conditioned on a correlated random variable Y is
defined as Hmin(X|Y ) = − log
(
Ey←Y
[
maxx Pr[X = x|Y = y]
])
.
Quantum computation. A comprehensive introduction to quantum computation and quantum
information can be found in [NC11] and [Wil13]. We denote a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space by H, and we use subscripts to distinguish registers. For example HR is the Hilbert space
of register R. The Euclidean norm over a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space H is denoted
as ‖ · ‖. A quantum register over the Hilbert space H = C2 is called a qubit. For n ∈ N, we refer
to quantum registers over the Hilbert space H = (C2)⊗n as n-qubit states. We use the word
“quantum state” to refer to both pure states (unit vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H) and density matrices (positive
semidefinite matrices ρ of unit trace in the space of density matrices D(H)). When n is clear
from the context, we denote by |φ+〉AB the maximally entangled n-qubit Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) [EPR35] state on the Hilbert space HA ⊗HB:
|φ+〉AB =
1√
2n
∑
v∈{0,1}n
|v〉A ⊗ |v〉B .
A POVM is a finite set {Mi} of positive semidefinite matrices with the property that∑iMi = 1,
where 1 is the identity matrix. The trace distance between two states ρ and σ is defined by
TD(ρ, σ) = 1
2
‖ρ − σ‖1. A quantum channel is a linear map Φ : HA → HB between two Hilbert
spaces HA and HB. We say that a channel Φ is completely positive if, for any ancilla register of
dimension n, the induced map 1n ⊗ Φ is positive, and we call it trace-preserving if it holds that
Tr[Φ(ρ)] = Tr[ρ], for all ρ ∈ D(HA). A quantum channel that is both completely positive and
trace-preserving is called a quantum CPTP channel. Let ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB) be a bipartite state.
Then, the min-entropy of A conditioned on system B is given by:
Hmin(A|B)ρ = − inf
σ∈D(HB)
Dmax
(
ρAB ||1A ⊗ σB
)
,
10
where Dmax
(
ρ ||σ) = infλ{λ : ρ ≤ 2λσ} is the max-relative entropy. A classical-quantum state
ρ ∈ D(HX ⊗HB) is a quantum state on registers X and B that depends on a classical variable X
in system X. If the variable X is distributed according to PX , the state ρ can be expressed as
ρXB =
∑
x
PX(x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρxB.
Let pg(X|B) = ∑x PX(x)Tr[ΛxρxB] be the optimal guessing probability for the variable X when us-
ing an optimal measurement strategy {Λx} that maximizes the expression. The quantity can then
be expressed in terms of the min-entropy via pg(X|B) = 2−Hmin(X|B) [KRS09]. By a polynomial-
time quantum algorithm (or QPT algorithm) we mean a polynomial-time uniform family of quan-
tum circuits, where each circuit in the circuit family is described by a sequence of unitary gates
and measurements. A quantum algorithm may, in general, receive (mixed) quantum states as
inputs and produce (mixed) quantum states as outputs. We oftentimes restrict QPT algorithms
implicitly; for example, if we write Pr[A(1λ) = 1] for a QPT algorithm A, it is implicit that A is
a QPT algorithm that output a single classical bit.
Definition 1 (Indistinguishability of ensembles of quantum states, [Wat06]). Let p : N → N be
a polynomially bounded function, and let ρλ and σλ be p(λ)-qubit quantum states. We say that
{ρλ}λ∈N and {σλ}λ∈N are quantum computationally indistinguishable ensembles of quantum states,
denoted by ρλ ≈c σλ , if, for any QPT distinguisher D with single-bit output, any polynomially
bounded q : N→ N, any family of q(λ)-qubit auxiliary states {νλ}λ∈N, and every λ ∈ N,∣∣Pr[D(ρλ ⊗ νλ) = 1]− Pr[D(σλ ⊗ νλ) = 1]∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) .
We also make use of the following standard results:
Lemma 1 (Ricochet property). Let n ∈ N and M ∈ C2n×2n be any matrix, and let |φ+〉AB an
EPR state on registers A and B on n qubits. Then,
(MA ⊗ 1B) |φ+〉AB = (1A ⊗MTB ) |φ+〉AB .
Lemma 2 (Gentle Measurement Lemma, [Win99, Aar05]). Let ρ be a density matrix, let Λ,
where 0 ≤ Λ ≤ 1, be an element of a POVM such that Tr[Λρ] ≥ 1 − , for some  > 0 and let
ρ˜ = ΛρΛ. Then:
TD(ρ, ρ˜) ≤ √.
And a slight variation of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 (Closeness to ideal states, [Unr15]). Let ρ be a density matrix, let Π be a projector,
and let  = Tr[(1−Π) ρ]. Then, there exists an ideal state ρid such that:
• TD(ρ, ρid) ≤ √
• ρid is a mixture in the image of Π, i.e. ρid = ∑i pi |ψi〉 〈ψi| is a normalized state with
|ψi〉 ∈ im(Π), ∑i pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0, for all i.
2.2 Monogamy of entanglement games
For a detailed introduction to monogamy-of-entanglement games, we refer the reader to [TFKW13],
where they were introduced and studied extensively. In this section, we limit ourselves to intro-
ducing a version of a monogamy-of-entanglement game that suffices for our purpose. Let λ ∈ N.
The game is between a challenger and an adversary, specified by a triple of interactive quantum
machines (A,B, C) (for a formal definition of interactive quantum machine we refer the reader
to [Unr12]). For brevity, we use the notation |xθ〉 = Hθ |x〉, where Hθ = Hθ1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Hθλ and
θ, x ∈ {0, 1}λ. The game takes place as follows:
• The challenger samples x, θ ← {0, 1}λ and sends the state |xθ〉 to A.
• A sends a quantum register to B and one to C.
• The challenger sends θ to both B and C.
• B and C return strings x′ and x′′ to the challenger.
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A, B and C are not allowed to communicate other than where specified by the game. A,B, C win
if x = x′ = x′′.
The following lemma, from [TFKW13], upper bounds the winning probability of an adversary
in the game. As stated in the form below, this lemma appears in [BL19].
Lemma 4. Let λ ∈ N. For any Hilbert spaces HB and HC, any families of POVMs on these
Hilbert spaces respectively,{{
Bxθ
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}λ
and
{{
Cxθ
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}λ
,
and any CPTP map Φ : D ((C2)⊗λ)→ D(HB ⊗HC), we have:
Eθ∈{0,1}λEx∈{0,1}λTr
[
Bxθ ⊗ Cxθ Φ
(
|xθ〉 〈xθ|
) ]
≤
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)λ
(1)
It is natural to wonder whether a similar guarantee holds also when x is sampled from a
distribution with high min-entropy, which is not necessarily uniform. This follows as a corollary
of Lemma 4.
Corollary 1. Let λ ∈ N. Let X be a random variable over {0, 1}λ with min-entropyHmin(X) ≥ h.
For any Hilbert spaces HB and HC, any family of POVMs on these Hilbert spaces respectively,{{
Bxθ
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}λ
and
{{
Cxθ
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}λ
,
and any CPTP map Φ : D ((C2)⊗λ)→ D(HB ⊗HC), we have:
∑
x∈{0,1}λ
Pr[X = x]EθTr
[
Bxθ ⊗ Cxθ Φ
(|xθ〉 〈xθ|) ] ≤ 2−h(1 + 1√
2
)λ
. (2)
Proof.∑
x∈{0,1}λ
Pr[X = x]EθTr
[
Bxθ ⊗ Cxθ Φ
(|xθ〉 〈xθ|) ] ≤ 2−h2λExEθTr[Bxθ ⊗ Cxθ Φ (|xθ〉 〈xθ|) ]
≤ 2−h+λ
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)λ
= 2−h
(
1 +
1√
2
)λ
.
(3)
Note that the second inequality follows from Lemma 4.
In particular, notice that when h > 4
5
λ, the RHS of (3) is less than 0.981λ, and thus negligible.
2.3 The quantum random oracle model
Oracles with quantum access have been studied extensively, for example in [BBBV97, BDF+11].
We say that a quantum algorithm A has oracle access to a classical functionH : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}m,
denoted by AH , if A is allowed to use a unitary gate OH at unit cost in time. The unitary OH
acts as follows on the computational basis states of a Hilbert space HA ⊗HB of λ+m qubits:
OH : |x〉A ⊗ |y〉B −→ |x〉A ⊗ |y ⊕H(x)〉B ,
where the operation ⊕ denotes bit-wise addition modulo 2. In general, we can model the interac-
tion of a quantum algorithm that makes q queries to an oracle H as (UOH)q, i.e. alternating uni-
tary computations and queries to the oracle H, where U is some operator acting on HA⊗HB⊗HC,
where HC is some auxiliary Hilbert space [BBBV97, BDF+11, Unr15]4. We call a (possibly super-
polynomial-time) quantum algorithm A with access to an oracle O query-bounded if A makes at
most polynomially many (in the size of its input) queries to O. The random oracle model refers to
4We can chose the algorithm’s unitaries between oracle calls to be all the same by introducing a “clock register” that
keeps track of the number of oracle calls made so far.
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a setting in which the function H : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}m is sampled uniformly at random. Random
oracles play an important role in cryptography as models for cryptographic hash functions in the
so-called random oracle model (ROM) [BR93]. For post-quantum and quantum cryptography,
random oracles modelling hash functions need to be quantum accessible (i.e. accessible as a uni-
tary gate, and thus in superposition), resulting in what is known as the quantum random oracle
model (QROM) [BDF+11]. Despite being uninstantiable in principle [CGH04, ES20], modeling
hash functions in the (Q)ROM is considered a standard assumption in cryptography.
2.3.1 Some technical lemmas
Recall that we denote by Bool(λ,m) the set of functions from {0, 1}λ to {0, 1}m.
Lemma 5. Let f : Bool(λ,m) → R, and x ∈ {0, 1}λ. For H ∈ Bool(λ,m) and y ∈ {0, 1}m, let
Hx,y ∈ Bool(λ,m) be such that
Hx,y(s) =
{
H(s) if s 6= x ,
y if s = x .
Then,
EHf(H) = EHEyf(Hx,y) .
Proof. The proof is straightforward, and can be found in Lemma 19 of [BL19].
The following is a technical lemma about a quantum adversary not being able to distinguish
between samples fromH(Uλ) and from Um, even when given oracle access toH, where the function
H : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}m is sampled uniformly at random.
Consider the following game between a challenger and a quantum adversary A, specified by
λ,m ∈ N, and a distribution X over {0, 1}λ,
• The challenger samples a uniformly random function H : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}m and b← {0, 1}.
• If b = 0: the challenger samples x← X, sends H(x) to A.
If b = 1: the challenger samples uniformly z ← {0, 1}m, sends z to A.
• A additionally gets oracle access to H. A returns a bit b′ to the challenger.
A wins if b = b′. Let Distinguish(A, λ,m,X) be a random variable for the outcome of the game.
Lemma 6. For any adversary A making q oracle queries, any family of distributions {Xλ : λ ∈ N}
where for all λ, Xλ is a distribution over {0, 1}λ, for any polynomially bounded function m : N→
N, there exists a negligible function µ such that, for any λ ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr[Distinguish(A, λ,m(λ), Xλ) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ (3q + 2)qM + µ(λ) ,
where M is a quantity that is negligible in λ if 2−Hmin(Xλ)/2 is negligible in λ.
Corollary 2. For any query-bounded adversary A, any  > 0, any family of distributions
{Xλ : λ ∈ N}, where Xλ is a distribution over {0, 1}λ with Hmin(Xλ) > λ for every λ, for
any polynomially bounded function m : N → N, there exists a negligible function µ such that, for
any λ ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr[Distinguish(A, λ,m(λ), Xλ) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ µ(λ) .
The key step in the proof of Lemma 6 is captured by the one-way-to-hiding lemma [Unr15,
AHU19]5. We restate it here following our notation (and provide a proof in the Appendix A.1 for
completeness). Informally, the lemma gives an upper bound on an adversary’s advantage (when
given access to a uniformly random function H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m) at distinguishing between a
sample drawn from H(Un) and a sample drawn from Um. The upper bound is in terms of the
probability that the adversary queries the oracle at the pre-image of the sample at some point
5While additional improved variants of the one-way to hiding lemma were developed [BHH+19, KSS+20], any of
them suffices for our asymptotic analysis.
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during its execution. Equivalently, given two oracles that are identical except on a single input
(or more generally on a subset of the inputs), the advantage of an adversary at distinguishing
the two oracles is bounded above in terms of the probability that the adversary queries at the
differing point (or at a point in the subset where they differ) at some point during its execution.
Lemma 7. Let λ,m ∈ N. For any q ∈ N, any unitaries U , any family of states {|ψx〉}x∈X , any
complete pair of orthogonal projectors (Π0,Π1) and any distribution X on {0, 1}λ, it holds that:
1
2
EHEx←X‖Π0(UOH)q (|H(x)〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEz←{0,1}m‖Π1(UOH)q (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
≤ 1
2
+ (3q + 2)qM , (4)
where OH is the oracle unitary for H : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}m, and M is given by
M =
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}mEk‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOHx,z )k |z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉 ‖
+
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}mEk‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOH)k |z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉 ‖ . (5)
Moreover, M is negligible if and only if the second term in M is negligible.
The lemma holds also when the states |ψx〉 are not necessarily pure (but we write them as
pure states for ease of notation).
Proof of Lemma 6. Without loss of generality, letA be specified by a unitary U , the oracle unitary
OH and a measurement given by projectors Π0 and Π1 = 1 − Π0, so that the unitary part of
A’s algorithm is (UOH)q, where q the number of oracle queries made by A. Then, A’s winning
probability is precisely given by,
Pr[Distinguish(A, λ,m,Xλ) = 1]
=
1
2
EHEx←Xλ‖Π0(UOH)q |H(x)〉 ‖2 +
1
2
EHEz←{0,1}m‖Π1(UOH)q |z〉 ‖2 , (6)
where we omit writing ancilla qubits initialized in the zero state that (UOH)q might be acting on.
Then, by Lemma 7, we have
Pr[Distinguish(A, λ,m,Xλ) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ (3q + 2)qM (7)
where M is the quantity given by
M =
1
2
EHEx←XλEz←{0,1}mEk‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOHx,z )k |z〉 ‖
+
1
2
EHEx←XλEz←{0,1}mEk‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOH)k |z〉 ‖ . (8)
Moreover, by Lemma 7, M is negligible if and only if the second term,
EHEx←XλEz←{0,1}mEk‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOH)k |z〉 ‖,
is negligible. Hence, it suffices to bound the above term. Notice that for any fixed H, z and k,
Ex←Xλ‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOH)k |z〉 ‖
≤
√
Ex←Xλ‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOH)k |z〉 ‖2
≤ 2−Hmin(Xλ)/2 . (9)
where the first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality (for concave functions), and the second
inequality uses the fact that the state (UOH)k |z〉 does not depend on x, and hence the quantity
under the square root is bounded above by the optimal probability of correctly predicting a sample
from X, which is, by definition, 2−Hmin(X). Therefore, M is negligible so long as 2−Hmin(Xλ) is
negligible.
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Finally, we define the notion of indistinguishability of ensembles of quantum states in the
QROM. This is similar to Definition 1.
Definition 2 (Indistinguishability of ensembles of quantum states in the QROM). Let m : N→ N
and p : N → N be polynomially bounded functions, and let ρHλ and σHλ be p(λ)-qubit states, for
H ∈ Bool(λ,m(λ)). We say that {ρHλ }λ∈N,H∈Bool(λ,m(λ)) and {σHλ }λ∈N,H∈Bool(λ,m(λ)) are quantum
computationally indistinguishable ensembles of quantum states, denoted by ρHλ ≈c σHλ , if, for any
QPT distinguisher DH with single-bit output, any polynomially bounded q : N→ N, any family of
q(λ)-qubit auxiliary states {νλ}λ∈N, and every λ ∈ N,
EH
∣∣Pr[DH(ρHλ ⊗ νλ) = 1]− Pr[DH(σHλ ⊗ νλ) = 1]∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) .
3 Quantum copy-protection
Except for some slight differences, our definition of a secure copy-protection scheme is identical
to the notion in [Aar09]. We elaborate on the differences in Section 3.1.
Definition 3 (Quantum copy-protection scheme). Let C be a family of classical circuits with a
single bit output. A quantum copy-protection (CP) scheme for C is a pair of QPT algorithms
(CP.Protect,CP.Eval) with the following properties:
• CP.Protect takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N and a classical circuit C ∈ C, and
outputs a quantum state ρ.
• CP.Eval takes as input a quantum state ρ and a string x, and outputs a single bit.
We say that the scheme is correct if, for any λ ∈ N, C ∈ C, and any input string x to C:
Pr[CP.Eval(ρ, x) = C(x) : ρ← CP.Protect(1λ, C)] ≥ 1− negl(λ).
(note that we think of CP.Protect as a deterministic procedure which outputs a mixed state; so the
probability in the above expression comes from CP.Eval.)
Two remarks are in order about Definition 3.
• For ease of exposition, we define copy-protection for circuits outputting a single bit. It is
straightforward to generalize the above definition to circuits with multi-bit output.
• While our definition only requires the ability to compute the circuit C on a single input
using the copy-protection state ρ, polynomially many evaluations are possible by delaying
any measurements in CP.Eval, and uncomputing after copying the output bit to recover the
approximate original state ρ.
We define security in terms of a game between a challenger and an adversary consisting of a
triple of QPT algorithms A = (P,F1,F2) - a “pirate” P and two “freeloaders” F1 and F2. The
game is specified by a security parameter λ, a distribution Dλ over circuits in C, an ensemble
{DC}C∈C where DC is a distribution over pairs of inputs to C ∈ C. We refer to {Dλ}λ∈N as the
program ensemble, and to {DC}C∈C as the input challenge ensemble. The security game proceeds
as follows.
• The challenger samples C ← Dλ and sends ρ← CP.Protect(1λ, C) to P.
• P creates a state on registers A and B, and sends A to F1 and B to F2.
• (input challenge phase:) The challenger samples (x1, x2)← DC and sends x1 to F1 and x2
to F2. (F1 and F2 are not allowed to communicate).
• F1 and F2 each return bits b1 and b2 to the challenger.
A = (P,F1,F2) win if b1 = C(x1) and b2 = C(x2). Let PiratingGame(λ,P,F1,F2, Dλ, {DC})
denote the Boolean random variable for whether the game is won or not.
Before defining security, we define ptrivDλ,{DC}C∈C to be the winning probability that is triv-
ially possible due to correctness: the pirate forwards the copy-protected program to one of the
freeloaders, and leaves the other one with guessing as his best option. Formally, let DˆC be the
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induced distribution of winning answer pairs, and let DˆC,i, for i ∈ {1, 2} be its marginals. We
define the optimal guessing probability of any of the two freeloaders,
ptrivDλ,{DC}C∈C = maxi∈{1,2}
max
b∈{0,1}
EC←DλDˆC,i(b).
We define security as follows:
Definition 4 (Security). A quantum copy-protection scheme for a family of circuits C is said
to be δ-secure with respect to the ensemble {Dλ}λ∈N of distributions over circuits in C, and with
respect to the ensemble {DC}C∈C, where DC is a distribution over pairs of inputs to program
C ∈ C, if for any QPT adversary (P,F1,F2), any λ ∈ N,
Pr[PiratingGame(λ,P,F1,F2, Dλ, {DC}) = 1] ≤ 1− δ(λ) + negl(λ) .
If δ(λ) = 1− ptrivDλ,{DC}C∈C , we simply say that the copy-protection scheme is secure.
Two remarks are in order about the above definition.
• The definition can be generalized by quantifying over all challenge distributions. The ac-
ceptable adversarial winning probability then needs to be related to the optimal guessing
probability for challenges drawn from the distribution. We refrain from such a generalization
for ease of exposition.
• We follow Aaronson [Aar05] in that the parameter δ quantifies security, not insecurity.
We decided in favor of this convention to maintain coherence with the previous literature
on quantum copy protection, despite the fact that in cryptography, the  in “-secure”
traditionally quantifies adversarial advantage which is a measure of insecurity.
3.1 Comparison with existing definitions of copy-protection
Two security definitions for copy-protection schemes have been considered previously, in [Aar09]
and [ALZ20]. Our definition is very similar to the original security definition of [Aar09]. The
only difference is the following. In [Aar09], a scheme is δ-secure if for any bounded adversary who
tries to create k+1 programs upon receiving k copy-protected copies the average number of input
challenges answered correctly is k(1 + δ). In contrast, in our definition, a scheme is δ-secure if,
for any bounded adversary, the probability that all k + 1 challenges are answered correctly is at
most 1 − δ. It is straightforward to see that these two choices are equivalent up to a factor of k
in the security. In the present work, we focus on the case of k = 1.
Our definition, and the definition in [Aar09], differ more substantially from the recent definition
in [ALZ20]. The definition in [ALZ20] is framed in terms of a security game between a challenger
and a pirate, who receives k copy-protected copies of a program (each created independently) and
returns to the challenger a state ρ on k + 1 registers, together with evaluation circuits Ci, for
i ∈ [k + 1]. The pirate loses if the challenger is able to find an input x such that Ci(ρi, x) 6= f(x)
for some i.
Such a game can equivalently be recast as a game between a challenger, a pirate, and k + 1
freeloaders: the only difference with our security game is that in [ALZ20] the challenger can be
thought of as being adaptive, meaning that it can look at the states ρi in order to find a challenge
input x on which some freeloader fails. Since this challenger has more power, this results in a
weaker security definition. In particular, a scheme which is δ-secure with respect to our security
definition, is also δ-secure with respect to the definition in [ALZ20]: the challenger from our
definition yields a simple challenger for [ALZ20].
One additional point about the definition in [ALZ20], which makes it a little unnatural, is that
it is not operational: the challenger might output an x such that Ci(ρi;x) 6= f(x), but she might
have destroyed the state ρi in the process, and is thus unable to verify this condition on her own.
4 Quantum copy-protection of point functions
In this section, we present a quantum copy-protection scheme for point functions, and prove its
security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM).
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In what follows, we consider a copy-protection scheme for the class of point functions Py with
marked input y ∈ {0, 1}n. Note that, for simplicity, we hand y to the copy-protection algorithm
as an input, rather than as a circuit for the point function Py itself.
Remark 1. In the following description, the size of the marked input n and the security parameter
λ are distinct variables (as they should be in principle). However, the security guarantee that we
will prove is with respect to ensembles of programs for which n = λ. When copy-protecting an
ensemble of programs, the level of security cannot be independent of the size of the inputs to the
programs, since a pirate with access to the copy-protected program can always determine the whole
truth table of the program in time 2n.
Recall that for v, θ ∈ {0, 1}λ, we use the notation |vθ〉 = Hθ |v〉, where Hθ = Hθ1 ⊗ . . .⊗Hθλ
is the Hadamard operator on λ many qubits. Our construction is the following:
Construction 1 (Copy-protection scheme for point functions). Let λ be the security parameter,
and let G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m(λ) and H : {0, 1}m(λ) → {0, 1}λ be hash functions, where m(λ) > λ,
and n is the input size of the point function. We define (CP.Protect,CP.Eval) as follows:
• CP.Protect(1λ, y): Takes as input a security parameter λ and a point function Py, succinctly
specified by the marked input y (of size n).
– Set θ = G(y).
– Sample v ← {0, 1}m(λ) uniformly at random. Let z = H(v).
– Output (|vθ〉 , z).
• CP.Eval(1λ, (ρ, z);x): Takes as input a security parameter λ, an alleged copy-protected pro-
gram (ρ, z), and a string x ∈ {0, 1}n (the input on which the program is to be evaluated).
– Set θ′ = G(x).
– Apply the Hadamard operator Hθ
′
to ρ. Append n+ 1 ancillary qubits, all in state |0〉,
and compute the hash function H with input ρ into the first n of them (possibly making
use of additional ancillary qubits). Then, coherently measure whether the first n ancilla
qubits are in state |z〉, recording the result in the last ancilla qubit, uncompute the hash
function H and undo the Hadamards Hθ
′
. Finally, measure the last ancilla qubit to
obtain a bit b as output.
In what follows, we will model both G and H in Construction 1 as random oracles on the
the appropriate domain and co-domains, i.e. we operate in the quantum random oracle model
(QROM). Before stating our main theorem about the security of Construction 1, we define the
following class of distributions over programs.
• DPF-UNP. The class of unpredictable point function distributions DPF-UNP consists of ensembles
D = {Dλ} where Dλ is a distribution over point functions on {0, 1}λ such that Py ← Dλ
satisfies Hmin(y) ≥ λ for some  > 0.
We also define the following class of distributions over input challenges.
• DPF-Chall. An ensemble D = {Dy}, where each Dy is a distribution over {0, 1}|y| × {0, 1}|y|,
belongs to the class DPF-Chall if there exists an efficiently sampleable family {Xλ} of distri-
butions over {0, 1}λ with Hmin(Xλ) ≥ λ, for some  > 0, such that Dy is the following
distribution (where λ = |y|):
– with probability 1/3, sample x← Xλ, and output (x, y).
– with probability 1/3, sample x← Xλ, and output (y, x).
– with probability 1/3, sample x, x′ ← Xλ, and output (x, x′).
We say the ensemble D is specified by the ensemble Xλ.
We finally define two classes of distributions over pairs of programs and challenges.
• DPF-pairs-stat. This consists of pairs of ensembles
(
D = {Dλ}, D′ = {D′y}
)
such that:
– D ∈ DPF-UNP and D′ ∈ DPF-Chall.
– Let D′ be specified by the family {Xλ}, and denote by MarkedInput(Dλ) the following
distribution over {0, 1}λ: sample Py ← Dλ, and ouput y. We require the families {Xλ}
and {MarkedInput(Dλ)} to be statistically indistinguishable.
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• DPF-pairs-comp. This is defined in the same way as DPF-pairs-stat, except that we only require
{Xλ} and {MarkedInput(Dλ)} to be computationally indistinguishable.
We are ready to state our main theorem about security of Construction 1.
Theorem 2. There exists a constant δ∗ > 0 such that, the scheme of Construction 1, with
m(λ) > 5λ, is a δ∗-secure quantum copy-protection scheme for point functions with respect to any
pair of ensembles (D,D′) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat (∈ DPF-pairs-comp), against query-bounded (computationally
bounded) adversaries in the quantum random oracle model (assuming the existence of quantum-
secure one-way functions).
We emphasize that quantum-secure one-way functions are only needed for the computational
version of Theorem 2.
Correctness of Construction 1 is immediate to verify, and makes use the fact that G is a
random oracle with a range that is sufficiently larger than its domain. The next section is devoted
to proving security.
4.1 Proof of security
We assume that (D,D′) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat (the case of (D,D′) ∈ DPF-pairs-comp is analogous except for
a slight difference in the proof of Lemma 10, which we will point out). Moreover, following the
notation for ensembles in (D,D′) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat, we let D′ be specified by an efficiently sampleable
family {Xλ} of distributions over {0, 1}λ. As discussed in Remark 1, we assume that n = λ in
Construction 1.
We will prove Theorem 2 through a sequence of hybrids.
H0: This is the security game PiratingGame for the copy-protection scheme of Construction 1.
• The challenger samples a point function Py ← Dλ with y ∈ {0, 1}λ, and sends the state
(|vθ〉 , z)← CP.Protect(1λ, y), where θ = G(y) and z = H(v), to the pirate P.
• P creates a state on registers A and B, and sends A to F1 and B to F2.
• (input challenge phase:) The challenger samples (x1, x2) ← D′y and sends x1 to F1 and x2
to F2. (F1 and F2 are not allowed to communicate).
• F1 and F2 return b1 and b2, respectively, and win if b1 = Py(x1) and b2 = Py(x2).
H1: Same as H0, except that in the input challenge phase the challenger samples (x1, x2)← D′y.
Then, it sends G(x1) and G(x2) to F1 and F2 respectively (instead of sending x1 and x2 directly).
H2: Same as H1, except for the following. During the input challenge phase, the challenger
samples (x1, x2) ← D′y. Then, for i ∈ {1, 2}, if xi 6= y, the challenger samples θ′i ← {0, 1}m(λ),
and sends θ′i to Fi instead of G(xi).
H3: Same as H2, except that in the first step of the security game, the challenger samples
θ ← {0, 1}m(λ) (as opposed to sampling Py ← Dλ and setting θ = G(y)). Then, in the input
challenge phase, if xi = y, the challenger sends θi := θ to Fi, and sends a uniformly random θ′i
otherwise.
H4: Same as H3, except that the challenger samples z ← {0, 1}λ instead of choosing z = H(v).
H5: Same as H4, except the pirate gets the challenge inputs θ1 and θ2 together with the copy-
protected program.
In the rest of the section, we say that x is a 0-input (1-input) to a boolean function f , if
f(x) = 0 (f(x) = 1). We prove the following two lemmas, which together give Theorem 2.
Lemma 8. For any adversary A,
Pr[A wins H5] ≤ 1
3
.
18
In the rest of the section, for any function g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], we use the notation
p(Hi) > g(p(Hj))− negl(λ)
as a shorthand for the following: for any adversary A for Hj , there exists an adversary A′ for Hi
and a negligible function µ such that
Pr[A′ wins Hi] > g(Pr[A wins Hj ])− µ(λ) .
Informally, one can think of p(Hi) the optimal winning probability in hybrid Hi (up to negli-
gible functions in the security parameter).
Lemma 9. There exists a constant δ∗ > 0 such that
p(H5) > p(H0)− 2/3 + δ∗ − negl(λ) . (10)
Lemmas 8 and 9 immediately imply that, for any adversary A for H0,
Pr[A wins H0] < 1− δ∗ + negl(λ) ,
which gives Theorem 2.
Proof of Lemma 8. Denote by x1 and x2 the inputs sampled by the challenger. There are three
cases: x1 and x2 are both 0-inputs; x1 is a 0-input and x2 is a 1-input; x1 is a 1-input and x2 is
a 0-input. We argue that the density matrix ρ that is handed to the pirate in all three cases is a
maximally mixed state. More precisely, when Py(x1) = 0, Py(x2) = 0, the state ρ that the pirate
receives is the following, which is completely independent of the oracle H:
Ev,θ,θ′,θ′′,z |vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |θ′〉 〈θ′| ⊗ |θ′′〉 〈θ′′| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|
=
1
23m+λ
, (11)
When Py(x1) = 0, Py(x2) = 1, the state ρ that the pirate receives is again completely inde-
pendent of the oracle, and is the following:
Ev,θ,θ′,z |vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |θ′〉 〈θ′| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|
=
1
23m+λ
, (12)
where crucially that the state is still maximally mixed.
The third case is analogous to the second. Thus it is impossible, even for an unbounded pirate
to distinguish the three cases with any advantage over random guessing.
We prove Lemma 9 by keeping track of how the optimal winning probability changes across
hybrids. We break down the proof into the following lemmas.
Lemma 10. p(H1) ≥ p(H0)− negl(λ).
Lemma 11. |p(H1)− p(H2)| = negl(λ).
Lemma 12. |p(H2)− p(H3)| = negl(λ).
Lemma 13. p(H4) > p(H3)− 2/3 + δ∗ − negl(λ), for some constant δ∗ > 0.
Lemma 14. p(H5) ≥ p(H4).
Lemma 9 follows immediately from Lemmas 10-14. The crux is Lemma 13.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let A = (P,F1,F2) be a query-bounded adversary that wins with probabil-
ity p in H0. We will construct an adversary A′ that wins with probability at least p− negl(λ) in
hybrid H1. The adversary A′ = (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) is the following:
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• Upon receiving (|Ψ〉 , z) from the challenger, where |Ψ〉 = |vG(y)〉 for some string y ∈ {0, 1}λ,
P ′ samples a uniformly random function Gˆ : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}m(λ) (in the computational
version of the argument, P ′ samples instead a function Gˆ from a quantum-secure pseudo-
random function (PRF) family. Note that a quantum-secure PRF family can be constructed
from any quantum-secure one-way function [Zha12]). Subsequently, P ′ runs P on input
(|Ψ〉 , z), using Gˆ to respond to queries to G. P ′ forwards the two registers A and B output
by P to F ′1 and F ′2, respectively, together with a description of Gˆ.
• F ′1 and F ′2 receive w1 = G(x1) and w2 = G(x2) respectively from the challenger, for some
x1 and x2. F ′1 and F ′2 sample x′1, x′2 ← Xλ. F ′1 runs F1 on input (x′1,A) and responds to
oracle queries to G using Gˆx′1,w1 , where
Gˆx′1,w1(x) =
{
Gˆ(x) if x 6= x′ ,
w1 if x = x′1 .
F ′1 returns to the challenger the output of F1. F ′2 proceeds analogously.
We claim that the success probability of (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) is at least p − negl(λ). We leave the
full details of the proof to Appendix A.2, as these are lengthy but not particularly enlightening.
Here, why provide some intuition about the reduction. The crucial observation is that there is
nothing special about the the marked input y in H0 other than the fact that the oracle G maps
it to the correct basis choice used by the challenger. What P ′ does (without ever seeing y) is
come up with x′1 and x′2, and then reprogram the oracle so that x′1 and x′2 map to the (correct or
incorrect) basis choices he received as part of the H1 game. Crucially, x1 and x2 are not sampled
uniformly at random, but from the distributionXλ which is statistically indistinguishable from the
distribution of marked inputs from which y is sampled (by definition of the challenge distribution
DPF-pairs-stat). This makes the distribution of the game played by the invoked adversary (P,F1,F2)
essentially the same as in the game H0. The only difference between the two games is that they
involve slightly different oracles, respectively Gˆ and G. Replacing one with the other can be done
without affecting the winning probability by more than a negligible amount as long as P does not
query at x′1 and x′2 with non-negligible probability, which is the case.
We point out that the proof of this lemma is the only step in the proof of Theorem 2 in which
one uses the indistinguishability condition in the definition of DPF-pairs-stat (and of DPF-pairs-comp for
the computational version of the result). This completes the proof of Lemma 10. We point out
that the first step in the proof of the computational version of Lemma 10 is to argue that using
a pseudorandom function (PRF) instead of a uniformly random function Gˆ does not change the
success probability of (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) more than negligibly, which is straightforward. The rest of the
proof for the version of Theorem 2 with DPF-pairs-comp is analogous to the proof for the version with
DPF-pairs-stat.
Proof of Lemma 11. Suppose for a contradiction that the lemma is false. Let A = (P,F1,F2) be
a query-bounded adversary that wins H1 with probability noticeably higher than H2 (the reverse
case being similar). We construct a query-bounded adversary A′ that distinguishes samples from
the distributions G(Xλ) and Um(λ), which cannot exist by Corollary 2. We assume here that
A′ has access to two samples from either G(Xλ) or Um(λ) (this assumption is justified by the
equivalence of single-sample and polynomially many-sample distinguishing tasks for efficiently
sampleable distributions). A′ receives as input two samples θ1, θ2 ∈ {0, 1}m(λ). A′ then simulates
the challenger in a copy-protection game of hybrid H1 with A, in the following way: in the
input challenge phase, it samples (x1, x2) ← D′y. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, if xi 6= y, A′ sends θi to
Fi (otherwise sends G(y)). If A wins the game, A′ guesses that the sample was from G(Xλ),
otherwise that it was from Um(λ).
Proof of Lemma 12. The proof is similar to the previous lemma. Suppose for a contradiction
that the lemma is false. Let A = (P,F1,F2) be a query-bounded adversary that wins H2 with
probability noticeably higher than H3 (the reverse case being similar). We construct a query-
bounded adversary A′ that distinguishes samples from the distributions G(Xλ) and Um(λ), which
cannot exist by Corollary 2. A′ receives as input a challenge θ ∈ {0, 1}m(λ). A′ then simulates
the challenger in a copy-protection game of hybrid H2 with A as follows. In the input challenge
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phase, it samples (x1, x2) ← D′y. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, if xi = y, A′ sends θ to Fi. If A wins the
game, A′ guesses that the sample was from G(Xλ), otherwise that it was from Um(λ).
Proof of Lemma 14. Given an adversary A that wins with probability p in H4, the adversary A′
for H5 which acts identically to A (i.e. P ignores the additional inputs θ1 and θ2 received at the
start, and simply forwards them to F1 and F2 respectively) clearly wins with probability p.
We move to the crux of the proof, Lemma 13. We break down the proof of Lemma 13 into a
few technical lemmas.
Lemma 15.∣∣∣Pr [(P,F1,F2) win H4 |x1 is a 0-input and x2 is a 0-input]
− Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win H3 |x1 is a 0-input and x2 is a 0-input
]∣∣∣ = negl(λ) (13)
Proof. Notice that the task of distinguishing H3 and H4 is precisely amenable to the one-way-to-
hiding lemma (in its form of Lemma 7). By an application Lemma 7, it is sufficient to show that
the probability that an adversary, with access to all of the information received in H4 (including
the input phase challenges, which in this case are independent of the correct basis choice), queries
the oracle at v is negligible. The latter is true, since an adversary violating this straightforwardly
gives an adversary which contradicts Lemma 4.
The next lemma is the crucial step in the proof of Lemma 13.
Lemma 16. For any bounded strategy (P,F1,F2), there exists a negligible function µ such that,
for all λ, there exists an i ∈ {1, 2} such that:∣∣∣Pr[Fi returns 1 in H4 |xi is a 1-input ]
− Pr [Fi returns 1 in H3 |xi is a 1-input ]∣∣∣ < 1− ∗ + µ(λ) , (14)
where we can take ∗ = 10−4.
The proof of Lemma 16 is fairly involved, and constitutes the main technical work in this
paper. We break the proof down into two parts:
• First, we show that an adversary violating Lemma 16 can be used to construct an adversary
that wins at a certain r-fold parallel repetition of an appropriate distinguishing game (where
one should think of r as a small constant), which we call Gr (Lemma 18).
• Next, we prove a technical lemma (Lemma 19, a generalization of a similar lemma in [BL19]),
which allows us to upper bound the probability of a query-bounded adversary winnning in
Gr (Lemma 20). Such an upper bound relies on Lemma 19 as well as on properties of
monogamy of entanglement games.
We discuss informally below, after the description of the game Gr, the reason why we consider
the r-fold parallel repetition of a natural distinguishing game.
Let  > 0. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a strategy (P,F1,F2) such that, for
all negligible functions µ, there exists some λ such that, for all i ∈ {1, 2},∣∣∣Pr[Fi returns 1 in H4|xi is a 1-input ]
− Pr[Fi returns 1 in H3|xi is a 1-input ]
∣∣∣ ≥ 1− + µ(λ) . (15)
Notice, in particular, that the above straightforwardly implies that, for all negligible functions
µ, there exist infinitely many λ’s such that, for all i ∈ {1, 2},∣∣∣Pr[Fi returns 1 in H4|xi is a 1-input ]
− Pr[Fi returns 1 in H3|xi is a 1-input ]
∣∣∣ ≥ 1− + µ(λ) . (16)
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Let r ∈ N. Given such (P,F1,F2), we will construct an adversary (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) that succeeds
at the following game Gr between a challenger and an adversary (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) with probability at
least 1 − g(), for some continuous, monotonically increasing function g() such that g(0) = 0.
Given a function H, we denote by Hx,y the function such that Hx,y(x′) = H(x′) for all x′ 6= x,
and Hx,y(x) = y. We describe game Gr as follows:
(i) The challenger samples θ, v ← {0, 1}m(λ), z′ ← {0, 1}λ, and w ← {0, 1}r as well as a random
oracle H : {0, 1}m(λ) → {0, 1}λ. The challenger then sends (|vθ〉 , z) with z = H(v) to P ′
who gets oracle access to H1, .., Hr, where
Hi =
{
H if wi = 0 ,
Hv,z′ if wi = 1 .
(ii) P ′ creates a bipartite state σ, and sends its two subsystems to F ′1 and F ′2, respectively.
(iii) The challenger sends θ to both F ′1 and F ′2.
(iv) F ′1 and F ′2 (who cannot communicate) return w′ and w′′ in {0, 1}r respectively to the
challenger.
(P ′,F ′1,F ′2) win if w′ = w′′ = w.
It might seem mysterious why we consider such r-fold parallel repetition of the more natural
distinguishing game with r = 1. The reason will become more apparent later in the proof. For
now, informally the reason is the following: in order to complete the proof of security, we will
need to employ a decision version of a one-way-to-hiding lemma for entangled parties. This does
not straightforwardly follow from the search version in [BL19], because of a factor of 9 loss in
the security compared to the non-entangled version the lemma. The parallel repetition allows to
overcome the security loss, and to obtain a non-trivial security statement.
The reduction we use to construct (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) winning at game Gr uses the so-called “Gentle
Measurement Lemma” or “Almost As Good As New Lemma” [Win99, Aar05]: if a measurement
succeeds with high probability, then the post-measurement state conditioned on success, is close
to the initial state. Specifically, we need the following lemma, which is a consequence of the
aforementioned lemmas.
Lemma 17. Let r ∈ N, let |ψ〉 to be a unit vector, and let {Πi}i∈[r] be such that for every i ∈ [r]:
‖Πi |ψ〉 ‖22 ≥ 1− .
Then, it follows that:
‖ΠrΠr−1...Π1 |ψ〉 ‖22 ≥ 1− 2r
√
.
Proof. Let |δi〉 = (1−Πi) |ψ〉 . We prove by induction that
Π`Π`−1...Π1 |ψ〉 = |ψ〉+ |η`〉 ,
for some vector |η`〉 such that ‖ |η`〉 ‖2 ≤ `√. The statement clearly holds for ` = 0. Assuming
it holds up to `− 1, we get
Π`Π`−1...Π1 |ψ〉 = Π` (|ψ〉+ |η`−1〉)
= |ψ〉 − |δ`〉+ Π` |η`−1〉
=: |ψ〉+ |η`〉 ,
where ‖ |η`〉 ‖2 ≤ `√ by the triangle inequality, the fact that projectors have unit operator norm,
and the inductive hypothesis. One more application of the triangle inequality shows that:
‖ΠrΠr−1...Π1 |ψ〉 ‖22 = ‖ |ψ〉+ |ηr〉 ‖22
≥ (1− r√)2
≥ 1− 2r√ε.
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We apply the above lemma to construct a strategy that wins at Gr.
Lemma 18. Suppose (P,F1,F2) satisfies (16) for some  > 0. Then, there exists (P ′,F ′1,F ′2)
such that, for any negligible function ν, there exist infinitely many λ, such that (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) wins
game Gr with security parameter λ with probability at least 1− 4r√+ ν(λ).
Proof. Note that we can equivalently recast the game in hybrid H3 as a game in which P receives
a uniformly random string z (instead of H(v)), but then the oracle is reprogrammed at v, so that
P has oracle access to Hv,z instead of H, where Hv,z(x) = H(x) if x 6= v, and H(v) = z.
Let q be the number of queries P makes. Without loss of generality, P’s strategy is specified
by a unitary U and takes the form (UOH)q.
Notice that
EHEvEθEzEk∈[q]
∥∥∥|v〉 〈v| (UOHv,z )k |vθ〉 ⊗ |z〉∥∥∥2 = negl(λ) . (17)
Suppose for a contradiction that the latter was not the case, then the pirate could recover the
classical string v with non-negligible probability and send v to both F1 and F2. This would give
a strategy that wins the monogamy game (more precisely the variant of Lemma 4).
By an application of a suitable variation of the one-way-to-hiding lemma (Lemma 7), the
global state after P’s action, including the challenger’s registers, is negligibly close in hybrids H3
and H4, i.e. there exists a negligible function ν′, such that∥∥∥EHEvEθEz |H〉 〈H| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ ((UOHv,z )q |vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|((UOHv,z )q)†)
− EHEvEθEz |H〉 〈H| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗
(
(UOH)q |vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|
(
(UOH)q
)†)∥∥∥
1
= ν′(λ) .
(18)
Now, by hypothesis, for any negligible function µ, for all i ∈ {1, 2} there exist infinitely many
λ such that (P,F1,F2) satisfies expression (16). In particular, we will use this hypothesis for a
choice of µ sufficiently large (with respect to the negligible functions ν and ν′).
We will also assume that, in (16), it is
Pr[Fi returns 1 in H4|xi is a 1-input ] > Pr[Fi returns 1 in H3|xi is a 1-input ] ,
for infinitely many such λ’s (the reverse case being similar). Let Λgood be the corresponding set
of such λ’s.
We will construct an adversary (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) for the game Gr with security parameter λ ∈ Λgood,
which wins with probability at least 1− 4r√+ ν(λ). The adversary (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) is as follows:
• P ′ receives ρ and z from the challenger and runs P on input ρ and z and using oracle H1 to
answer any query by P (although any other Hi would be fine). Let ρ˜ (a bipartite state) be
the output. P ′ sends the first subsystem to F ′1 and the second subsystem to F ′2.
• F ′1 and F ′2 receive θ from the challenger. For i ∈ [r], they do the following:
– Let b ∈ {1, 2}, F ′b runs Fb on input the system received from P ′ and θ, using oracle Hi.
Let w(b)i be the outcome. F ′b runs the inverse of the computation run by Fb before the
measurement.
• F ′b returns the string (w(b)1 , . . . , w(b)r ) to the challenger.
For i ∈ [r], let Ubi be the unitary implemented by Fb when run with oracle Hi, and let Πbi be the
projector corresponding to the correct outcome in the final measurement. Define the projectors
Π˜bi =
(
Ubi
)†
ΠbiU
b
i . Crucially, Equation (18), together with the hypothesis of Lemma 18 (used
with a sufficiently large negligible function µ), imply the following:
• If |ψ〉 is a purification of the state ρ˜ returned by P to P ′, then, for all b ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ [r]:
‖Π˜bi |ψ〉 ‖2 ≥ 1− + µ′(λ) (19)
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for a sufficiently large negligible function µ′, and for infinitely many λ.
Applying the variant of the “Gentle Measurement Lemma” from Lemma 17 implies that F ′b suc-
ceeds with probability at least 1−2r√+ 1
2
ν(λ). By a union bound, we conclude that (P ′,F ′1,F ′2)
win with probability at least 1− 4r√+ ν(λ), for infinitely many λ, as desired.
Next, our goal is to upper bound the probability that a query-bounded adversary (P,F1,F2)
wins Gr by the probability that F1 and F2 simultaneously query the oracle at point v. This is
captured by the following technical lemma, which we specialize to our exact case in the subsequent
corollary. Before stating the lemma, we introduce some notation. Let F : X → Y. Let v ∈ X r be
such that all vi are distinct, for i ∈ [r], and let z ∈ Yr. We denote by Fv,z the function,
Fv,z(x) =
{
F (x) if x 6= vi for all i ,
zi if x = vi .
Lemma 19. Let X ,Y,R be sets of binary strings. Let r ∈ N. Let F be a function-valued random
variable, where each function is from X to Y. Let Z ⊆ Yr. For any v ∈ X r, any injective function
g : Z → R, any distribution Z on Z, any unitaries UB, UC, any bipartite state |ψ〉, any qB, qC ∈ N,
the following holds:
EFEz←Z
∥∥∥Πg(z) (UBOFv,zB )qB ⊗(UCOFv,zC )qC |ψ〉 ∥∥∥2 (20)
≤ 9pmax + poly(qB, qC)
√
M , (21)
where Πw = ΠwB ⊗ΠwC , pmax = maxr∈R Pr[g(z) = r : z ← Z], and
M = EkElEFEz←Z
∥∥∥(Pv ⊗ Pv)(UBOFv,zB )k ⊗ (UCOFv,zC )l) |ψ〉 ∥∥∥2 ,
where Pv =
∑r
i=1 |vi〉 〈vi|.
Proof. The following proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 21 in [BL19], but extended to a
slightly more general setting.
For L ∈ {B,C}, let V FL =
(
ULO
F
L (1− Pv)
)qL and WFL = (ULOFL )qL − V FL .
Fix v ∈ X r, a set Z ⊆ Yr and z ∈ Z. We have the following.
‖Πg(z))
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ (UCOFv,zC )qC) |ψ〉 ‖2
= ‖Πg(z)
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ V Fv,zC + V Fv,zB ⊗WFv,zC +WFv,zB ⊗WFv,zC ) |ψ〉 ‖2 (22)
≤ ‖Πg(z)
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ V Fv,zC + V Fv,zB ⊗WFv,zC ) |ψ〉 ‖2
+ (3qBqC + 2)qBqC EkEl
∥∥∥∥Pv ⊗ Pv ((UBOFv,zB )k ⊗ (UCOFv,zC )l) |ψ〉∥∥∥∥ , (23)
where the inequality follows from a triangle inequality together with a bound used in [BL19] (more
precisely, Lemma 18 in [BL19]). Applying Jensen’s inequality and the definition of M , we obtain
EFEz←Z‖Πg(z)
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ (UCOFv,zC )qC) |ψ〉 ‖2
≤ EFEz←Z‖Πg(z)
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ V Fv,zC + V Fv,zB ⊗WFv,zC ) |ψ〉 ‖2 (24)
+ (3qBqC + 2)qBqC
√
M (25)
We will show that, for any fixed F ,
Ez←Z‖Πg(z)
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ V Fv,zC + V Fv,zB ⊗WFv,zC ) |ψ〉 ‖2 ≤ 9pmax .
Let
α = Ez←Z‖Πg(z)
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ V Fv,zC ) |ψ〉 ‖2 ,
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and
β = Ez←Z‖Πg(z)
(
V
Fv,z
B ⊗W
Fv,z
C
)
|ψ〉 ‖2 .
Applying triangle inequalities, and using that the Πg(z) are orthogonal projectors, we get
Ez←Z‖Πg(z)
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ V Fv,zC + V Fv,zB ⊗WFv,zC ) |ψ〉 ‖2 ≤ α+ β + 2√αβ (26)
Now, notice that V Fv,zB and V
Fv,z
C do not depend on z, since they always project on the support
of 1− Pv. Using standard properties of the operator norm, we get
α = Ez←Z‖Πg(z)
((
UBO
Fv,z
B
)qB ⊗ V Fv,zC ) |ψ〉 ‖2 (27)
≤ Ez←Z‖(1B ⊗Πg(z)C )
(
1B ⊗ V Fv,zC
)
|ψ〉 ‖2 (28)
≤ 〈ψ|1B ⊗
((
V
Fv,z
C
)† (
Ez←ZΠg(z)C
)
V
Fv,z
C
)
|ψ〉 (29)
≤ pmax , (30)
where the last line follows because Ez←ZΠg(z)C ≤ pmax 1.
Similarly, one obtains β ≤ 4pmax , where the factor of 4 is due to the fact that WFv,zC is not
unitary in general, and so we upper bound it by using
‖WFv,zC ‖∞ ≤ ‖
(
UCO
Fv,z
C
)qC ‖∞ + ‖V Fv,zC ‖∞ ≤ 2 .
It follows that α+ β + 2
√
αβ ≤ 9pmax , as desired.
We specialize Lemma 19 to our exact case in the following corollary. Before stating the
corollary, let’s fix some notation. For functions H1, . . . , Hr, we define a “combined” oracle unitary
OH1,...,Hr , acting on a “control” register, a “query” register, and an auxiliary register, as follows:
OH1,...,Hr |i〉 |x〉 |0〉 = |i〉OHi(|x〉 |0〉) .
Corollary 3. Let r ∈ N. Let v ∈ {0, 1}m(λ) and z, z′ ∈ {0, 1}λ. For all unitaries UB, UC, for all
bipartite states |ψ〉, the following holds:
EHEw←{0,1}r‖Πw
(
UBO
H
w1
v,z ,..,H
wr
v,z
B
)qB
⊗
(
UCO
H
w1
v,z ,..,H
wr
v,z
C
)qC
|ψ〉 ‖2 (31)
≤ 9
2r
+ poly(qB, qC)
√
M, (32)
where Πw = ΠwB ⊗ΠwC is a projector, where H : {0, 1}m(λ) → {0, 1}λ and, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Hbv,z :=
{
Hv,z if b = 0 ,
Hv,z′ if b = 1 ,
and
M = EkElEHEw‖ |v〉 〈v| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| (UBOH
w1
v,z ,..,H
wr
v,z
B )
k ⊗ (UCOH
w1
v,z ,..,H
wr
v,z
C )
l |ψ〉 ‖2 .
Proof. We apply Lemma 19 with
• R = {0, 1}r, X = [r]× {0, 1}m(λ), Y = {0, 1}λ.
• Z = {(z1, . . . , zr) : zi ∈ {z, z′}}, and Z the uniform distribution over Z,
• g : Z → R such that g(z1, . . . , zr) = w where wi = 0 if zi = z and wi = 1 if zi = z′.
• F : X → Y is such that F (i, x) = (i,H(x)).
• v = ((1, v), . . . , (r, v)).
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Lemma 20. For all query-bounded adversaries A there exists a negligible function µ such that A
wins game Gr with probability at most 92r + µ(λ).
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there existed an adversary (P,F1,F2), and a polynomial
p > 0, such that (P,F1,F2) wins game Gr with probability greater than 92r + 1/p(λ) for infinitely
many λ’s. We show that this implies an adversary that wins at the following variant of the
monogamy game of Section 2.2. Let λ, λ′ ∈ N. For clarity, we will denote the adversary in this
monogamy game as the triple (P ′, F ′1,F ′2).
• The challenger samples uniformly θ, v ← {0, 1}λ as in the original game. The challenger
picks a uniformly random function H : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ′ and sends H(v) to P ′.
• Additionally, the challenger samples uniformly w ← {0, 1}r, and z ← {0, 1}λ′ . P, F1 and
F2 get oracle access to Hwiv,z, for i ∈ [r], where
Hbv,z :=
{
H if b = 0 ,
Hv,z if b = 1 .
• The rest proceeds as in the original monogamy game.
We claim that as long as λ′ < 1
5
λ, any adversary wins with at most negligible probability
in the game. The reason is that as long as λ′ < 1
5
λ, we have Hmin(V |E) > 45λ, where V is the
random variable for the string v, and E represents all classical and quantum information that the
adversary gets. Thus, Corollary 1 applies.
Next, we are ready to construct an adversary (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) for the above monogamy game from
an adversary (P,F1,F2) winning game Gr with probability > 92r +1/p(λ) for some λ. (P ′,F ′1,F ′2)
is as follows:
• P ′ runs P on the state received from the challenger. The output is a state on two registers:
P ′ sends the first half to F ′1 and the second half to F ′2.
• Let q1 and q2 be the number of oracle queries performed by the F1 and F2 algorithms. F ′1
and F ′2 respectively pick uniformly k ← [q1] and l ← [q2]. Then, F ′1 and F ′2 respectively
run the F1 and F2 algorithms for k and l queries, using oracle access to Hwiv,z, for i ∈ [r].
Finally, F ′1 and F ′2 measure the respective oracle registers and return their outcomes to the
challenger.
By Corollary 3, the outcome returned by F ′1 and F ′2 is v with inverse-polynomial probability.
Proof of Lemma 16. Combining lemmas 18 and 20, we deduce that, for any r ≥ 4, the statement
of Lemma 16 must hold for any ∗ such that
1− 4r√∗ > 10
2r
.
Taking r = 5, we deduce that the statement of Lemma 16 holds for any ∗ ≤ 10−4.
Proof of Lemma 13. Let (P,F1,F2) be a strategy that wins with probability p in H3. We will
argue that (P,F1,F2) wins with probability at least p − 23 + δ∗ − negl(λ) in H4, where δ∗ > 0.
When considering the winning probability of a strategy, we can divide the analysis into three
cases bases on what type of inputs the challenger is challenging F1 and F2 on. Let θ ∈ {0, 1}m(λ)
denote the basis choice used to encode a string v ∈ {0, 1}m(λ). Then, in the input challenge phase,
F1 and F2 receive basis choices θ1 and θ2, respectively, according to the following distribution:
(i) with probability 1
3
, the challenger picks uniformly random θ′, θ′′ ∈ {0, 1}m(λ), sends θ′ to F1
and θ′′ to F2.
(ii) with probability 1
3
, the challenger picks a uniformly random θ′ ∈ {0, 1}m(λ), sends θ′ to F1
and the correct basis choice θ to F2.
(iii) with probability 1
3
, the challenger picks a uniformly random θ′ ∈ {0, 1}λ, sends the correct
basis choice θ to F1 and θ′ to F2.
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Conditioned on case (i), we argue that the winning probabilities of P,F1,F2 in H3 and in H4
are negligibly close, i.e. there exists a negligible function ν such that:∣∣∣Pr [(P,F1,F2) win in H4 | θ1 is random and θ2 is random]
− Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is random and θ2 is random
]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ). (33)
This follows from a similar argument made earlier. By an application of the one-way-to-hiding
lemma, one can bound the advantage in distinguishing H3 from H4 by the probability of querying
at the encoded point v. An adversary that queries with non-negligible probability at v straight-
forwardly yields an adversary that wins with non-negligible probability at the monogamy of en-
tanglement game of Lemma 4. This implies that the winning probability of (P,F1,F2) in H4 is
at least p− 2
3
− ν(λ).
What we will argue next is that in fact the lower bound is p − 2
3
+ δ∗ − negl(λ), for some
δ∗ > 0. We appeal to Lemma 16, by which there exists ∗ > 0 (where we can take ∗ = 10−4),
and a negligible function µ, such that for all λ, there exists an i ∈ {1, 2} such that Fi satisfies∣∣∣Pr[Fi returns 1 in H4 | θi is correct ]
− Pr[Fi returns 1 in H3 | θi is correct]
∣∣∣ < 1− ∗ + µ(λ) . (34)
Fix a λ, and assume (34) holds for i = 1 for this particular λ (the other case being analogous).
We consider the two cases:
(a)
Pr[(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is random] > 1− 
∗
3
. (35)
(b)
Pr[(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is a correct and θ2 is random] ≤ 1− 
∗
3
. (36)
We start by assuming (a). Then, Equation (34) implies that
Pr[F1 returns 1 in H4 | θ1 is correct] > 2
∗
3
− µ(λ) , (37)
where we are using the fact that the correlation generated by F1 and F2 is non-signalling to
remove the condition of θ2 being random.
By the same argument used for case (i), notice that
|Pr[F2 returns 0 in H3 | θ2 is random ]− Pr[F2 returns 0 in H4 | θ2 is random ]| ≤ negl(λ) .
Then, Equation (35) implies
Pr[F2 returns 0 in H4 | θ2 is random] > 1− 
∗
3
− negl(λ) , (38)
where we again use the fact that the correlation generated by F1 and F2 is non-signalling.
Combining (37) and (38), and using a union bound implies that
Pr[(P,F1,F2) win in H4 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is random] > 
∗
3
− negl(λ) . (39)
Thus, Equations (35) and (39) trivially imply that
Pr[(P,F1,F2) win in H4 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is random]
> Pr[(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is random]−
(
1− 
∗
3
)
− negl(λ) . (40)
Now, equations (33) and (40) imply:
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Pr[(P,F1,F2) win in H4]
=
1
3
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H4 | θ1 is random and θ2 is random
]
+
1
3
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H4 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is random
]
+
1
3
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H4 | θ1 is random and θ2 is correct
]
>
1
3
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is random and θ2 is random
]
+
1
3
(
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is a random
]− 1 + ∗
3
)
+
1
3
(
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is random and θ2 is correct
]− 1)− negl(λ)
= p− 2
3
+
∗
9
− negl(λ) . (41)
Now, instead, we assume (b), i.e.
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is random
] ≤ 1− ∗
3
. (42)
Then, we immediately have
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H4 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is random
]
> Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H3 | θ1 is correct and θ2 is random
]− (1− ∗
3
)
. (43)
A similar calculation to Equation (41) gives
Pr
[
(P,F1,F2) win in H4
]
> p− 2
3
+
∗
9
− negl(λ) . (44)
This gives the desired bound with δ∗ = 
∗
9
.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 13, and hence of Theorem 2.
4.2 Proof of quantum virtual black-box obfuscation
In this section, we show that our quantum copy-protection scheme for point functions is also
a quantum virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscator [AF16]. In particular, we will show that the
algorithm CP.Protect from Construction 1 satisfies a notion of obfuscation called distributional
indistinguishability, which for evasive classes of circuits is equivalent to VBB obfuscation [WZ17]
(it is straightforward to see that distributional indistinguishability implies VBB - the reverse
implication requires slightly more work). CP.Protect is already functionality preserving, this
follows from the definition of a copy-protection scheme. All that is left to show is security. In
what follows, we assume that a program has an associated set of parameters P.params (input size,
output size, circuit size) which we are not required to hide.
Definition 5 (Distributional indistinguishability). An obfuscator Obf for the class of distributions
D over programs C, satisfies distributional indistinguishability if there exists a QPT simulator Sim,
such that for every distribution ensemble D = {Dλ} ∈ D, we have
EP←DλObf(1
λ, P ) ≈c Sim(1λ, P.params) . (45)
(where the notation “≈c” was introduced in Definition 1.) We remark that the notion of indistin-
guishability of ensembles of quantum states (Definition 1) already accounts for auxiliary quantum
information in the two ensembles.
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Distributional indistinguishability relative to any oracle is analogous to Definition 5, except
that the algorithms Obf and Sim are quantum oracle algorithms, and the notation “≈c” refers to
Definition 2.
Theorem 3. The QPT algorithm CP.Protect from Construction 1 satisfies distributional indis-
tinguishability in the QROM for the class of distributions DPF-UNP.
Proof. We define the following simulator Sim:
• Sim takes as input 1λ, an auxiliary state ν, and outputs the state: 1
2m(λ)+λ
⊗ ν, where the
first factor is the maximally mixed state on m(λ) + λ qubits.
Let
ρλ,G,H := EPy←DλCP.Protect
G,H(1λ, Py) = EPy←DλEv |vG(y)〉 〈vG(y)| ⊗ |H(v)〉 〈H(v)| ,
and
σλ,H := EθEv |vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |H(v)〉 〈H(v)| .
By an argument analogous to that of the proof of Lemma 11, it holds that, for any computa-
tionally bounded oracle adversary A, and any auxiliary state νλ,
EG,H
∣∣Pr[AG,H(ρλ,G,H ⊗ νλ) = 1]− Pr[AG,H(σλ,H ⊗ νλ) = 1]∣∣ = negl(λ) .
Next, we replace the state σλ,H with the state σ′λ := EθEvEz |vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|. We argue that
for any query bounded adversary A, the following holds:
EH
∣∣Pr[AH(σλ,H ⊗ νλ) = 1]− Pr[AH(σ′λ ⊗ νλ) = 1]∣∣ = negl(λ) . (46)
Let A be a distinguisher making q queries. Without loss of generality, let A be specified by
the unitary (UOH)q, for some unitary U .
We apply one-way-to-hiding (Lemma 7) to deduce that the LHS of (46) is negligible if the
quantity
EHEvEθEz←{0,1}mEkTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOH)k (|vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z| ⊗ νλ) (UOH)k]
is negligible.
Suppose for a contradiction the latter is not negligible. Then, we can construct an adversary
that wins at the monogamy of entanglement game of Lemma 4. The reduction is straightforward:
the adversary for the monogamy of entanglement game prepares the auxiliary state νλ, and runs
A (by simulating an oracle) to extract v. Then sends v to both B and C (using the notation for
the monogamy game of Lemma 4).
The conclusion of the theorem follows by observing that σ′λ is the maximally mixed state.
5 Extension to compute-and-compare programs
In this section, we show that a quantum copy-protection scheme for point functions, which is
secure with respect to the appropriate program and challenge ensembles, implies a quantum
copy-protection scheme for compute-and-compare programs with the same level of security.
The idea is simple: to copy-protect the compute-and-compare program CC[f, y], we copy-
protect the point function Py, and give f in the clear. By copy-protecting Py we are copy-
protecting the portion of the compute-and-compare program which checks equality with y. The
intuition is that this is sufficient to make the functionality unclonable because its output is not
already determined by f . More generally, one might suspect that, for copy-protecting a function
F = f1 ◦ f2... ◦ f`, it should be sufficient to copy-protect any of the functions fi that is sufficiently
non-constant within its context.
Let (CP-PF.Protect,CP-PF.Eval) be a copy-protection scheme for point functions.
Construction 2 (Copy-protection scheme for compute-and-compare programs). The copy-protection
scheme for compute-and-compare programs (CP-CC.Protect,CP-CC.Eval) is defined as follows:
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• CP-CC.Protect(1λ, (f, y)): Takes as input a security parameter λ and a compute-and-compare
program CC[f, y], specified succinctly by f and y. Then,
– Let ρ = CP-PF.Protect(λ, y)).
– Output (f, ρ).
• CP-CC.Eval(1λ, (f, ρ);x): Takes as input a security parameter λ, an alleged copy-protected
program (f, ρ), and a string x ∈ {0, 1}n (where n is the size of the inputs to f). Then,
– Compute y′ = f(x).
– Let b← CP-PF.Eval(ρ; y′). Output b.
Recall the definition of the class of distributions over point functions DPF-UNP from Section 4.
We define a related class of distributions over compute-and-compare programs.
• DCC-UNP. We refer to this class as the class of unpredictable compute-and-compare programs.
This consists of ensembles D = {Dλ} where Dλ is a distribution over compute-and-compare
programs such that CC[f, y] ← Dλ satisfies Hmin(y|f) ≥ λ for some  > 0, and where the
input length of f is λ and the output length is bounded by some polynomial t(λ).
We also define the following class of distributions over input challenges:
• DCC-Chall. An ensemble D = {Df,y}, where each Df,y is a distribution over pairs of elements
in the domain of f , belongs to the class DCC-Chall if there exists an efficiently sampleable
family {Xλ} of distributions over {0, 1}λ with Hmin(Xλ) ≥ λ, for some  > 0, and an
efficiently sampleable family {Zf,y}, where Zf,y is a distribution over the set f−1(y), such
that Df,y is the following distribution (where λ is the size of inputs to f):
– With probability 1/3, sample z ← Zf,y and x← Xλ, and output (x, z).
– With probability 1/3, sample z ← Zf,y and x← Xλ, and output (z, x).
– With probability 1/3, sample x, x′ ← Xλ, and output (x, x′).
We say the ensemble D is specified by the families {Xλ} and {Zf,y}.
Just like in the point function case, we also define two classes of distributions over pairs of
programs and challenges.
• DCC-pairs-stat. This consists of pairs of ensembles
(
D = {Dλ}, D′ = {D′f,y}
)
whereD ∈ DCC-UNP
and D′ ∈ DCC-Chall satisfying the following. Let D′ be parametrized by the families {Xλ} and
{Zf,y} (following the notation introduced above), and denote by MarkedInput (Dλ, {Zf,y})
the distribution over {0, 1}λ induced by Dλ and {Zf,y}, i.e.:
– Sample (f, y)← Dλ, then z ← Zf,y.
For any fixed f∗ with domain {0, 1}λ such that (f∗, y∗) is in the support of Dλ for some y∗,
denote byMarkedInput(Dλ, {Zf,y})|f∗ , the distributionMarkedInput(Dλ, {Zf,y}) conditioned
onDλ sampling f∗. Then, we require that, for any sequence {f (λ)∗ } (where, for all λ, (f (λ)∗ , y∗)
is in the support of Dλ for some y∗), the families {Xλ} and {MarkedInput(Dλ, {Zf,y})|f(λ)∗ }
are statistically indistinguishable.
• DCC-pairs-comp. This is defined in the same way as DCC-pairs-stat, except that we only require
{Xλ} and {MarkedInput(Dλ, {Zf,y})|f(λ)∗ } to be computationally indistinguishable.
Theorem 4. Let (CP-PF.Protect,CP-PF.Eval) be a copy-protection scheme for point functions
that is δ-secure with respect to all pairs (D,D′) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat (∈ DPF-pairs-comp). Then, the scheme
of Construction 2, instantiated with (CP-PF.Protect,CP-PF.Eval), is a δ-secure copy-protection
scheme for compute-and-compare programs with respect to all pairs (D,D′) ∈ DCC-pairs-stat (∈
DCC-pairs-comp). The same conclusion holds relative to any oracle, i.e. when all algorithms have
access to the same oracle, with respect to query-bounded (computationally bounded) adversaries.
Proof. We prove the theorem for the case of ({Dλ}, {Df,y}) ∈ DCC-pairs-stat (the case of ({Dλ}, {Df,y}) ∈
DCC-pairs-comp being virtually identical). Let t(λ) be the length of strings in the range of f ’s sam-
pled from Dλ. Let the ensemble {Df,y} be specified by {Zf,y} and {Xλ} (using the notation
introduced above for ensembles in DCC-Chall).
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Let A = (P,F1,F2) be an adversary for the compute-and-compare copy-protection scheme of
Construction 2 with respect to ensembles {Dλ} and {Df,y}. Suppose A wins with probability
p(λ) > 0. It follows that for each λ there exists f (λ)∗ such that (f
(λ)
∗ , y) is in the support of Dλ
for some y, and the probability that A wins is at least p(λ), conditioned on f (λ) being sampled.
We will construct an adversary A′ that wins with probability p(λ) − negl(λ) in the point
function security game with respect to {D′t(λ)} and {D′y}, defined as follows:
• D′t(λ): sample x← Xλ and output the point function Pf(λ)∗ (x).
• D′y: sample (x, x′)← Df(λ)∗ ,y and output (f
(λ)
∗ (x), f
(λ)
∗ (x′)).
The adversary A′ = (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) then acts as follows:
• P ′ receives as input a state ρ. Then, P ′ provides (f (λ)∗ , ρ) as input to P. Let A1 and A2 be
the registers returned by P. P ′ forwards A1 and A2 to F ′1 and F ′2 respectively.
• Upon receiving a challenge xi, F ′i samples x′i ← Zf,xi . F ′i then runs Fi on input x′i and the
register Ai. Let bi be the output returned by Fi. F ′i returns bi to the challenger.
It is straightforward to check that the game “simulated” by (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) for (P,F1,F2) is
statistically indistinguishable from a security game with respect to {Dλ} and {Df,y}, conditioned
on f (λ)∗ . Thus, we deduce, by hypothesis, that F1 and F2 both return the correct bits with
probability at least p(λ) − negl(λ), and thus (P ′,F ′1,F ′2) wins with probability at least p(λ) −
negl(λ). Crucially, note that
({D′t(λ)}, {D′y}) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat. It follows that if the point function
copy-protection scheme is δ-secure, then the compute-and-compare copy-protection scheme must
also be δ-secure. It is easy to check that all steps of the proof also hold relative to an oracle.
Corollary 4. Let δ∗ > 0 be the constant from Theorem 2. There exists a δ∗-secure copy-protection
scheme for compute-and-compare programs with respect to ensembles (D,D′) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat (∈
DPF-pairs-comp) against query-bounded adversaries (computationally bounded adversaries, assuming
the existence of quantum-secure one-way functions).
Proof. Combining Theorem 2 with Theorem 4 immediately gives this corollary.
6 Secure software leasing
Recall that the level of security achieved by our copy-protection scheme in Theorem 2 is far from
ideal. In this section, we show that our construction (augmented with a verification routine)
satisfies a weaker notion of copy-protection called “secure software leasing” (SSL), introduced in
[ALP20], but with a standard level of security, i.e. the adversarial success probability is negligible
in the security parameter. We formalize the notion of SSL in the following section.
Definition 6 (Secure software leasing). Let C be a family of classical circuits with a single bit
output. A secure software leasing (SSL) scheme (SSL.Gen, SSL.Lease, SSL.Eval, SSL.Verify) consists
of the following QPT algorithms:
• SSL.Gen(1λ) takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a secret key sk.
• SSL.Lease(sk, C) takes as input a secret key sk and a poly(λ)-sized circuit C ∈ C with input
size n, and outputs a quantum state ρC .
• SSL.Eval(x, ρC) takes a string x as input to C together with a state ρC , and outputs a bit
and a post-evaluation state ρ˜C .
• SSL.Verify(sk, C, σ) takes as input the secret key sk, the circuit C ∈ C and a state σ, and
outputs 1, if σ is a valid lease state for C, and 0 otherwise.
Above, we have defined the algorithms SSL.Eval and SSL.Verify with quantum states as inputs.
To formalize security, however, we need to provide as inputs to them parts of quantum states
supported on several registers.
The following definitions introduce further properties of secure software leasing schemes.
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Definition 7 (Correctness). An SSL scheme (SSL.Gen, SSL.Lease,SSL.Eval, SSL.Verify) is called
correct for a family of circuits C if, for all C ∈ C, there exists a negligible function negl satisfying,
• Correctness of evaluation:
∀x ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr [SSL.Eval(x, ρC) = C(x)] ≥ 1− negl(λ).
• Correctness of verification:
Pr
[
SSL.Verify(sk, C, ρC) = 1
] ≥ 1− negl(λ).
Security is defined in terms of a security game between a lessor and an adversary (the lessee).
Informally, any secure software leasing (SSL) scheme should satisfy the following key property.
After receiving a leased copy of C denoted by ρC (generated using SSL.Lease), the adversary
should not be able to produce a quantum state σ on registers R1 and R2 such that:
• SSL.Verify deems the contents of register R1 of σR1R2 to be valid, once it is returned.
• The adversary can still compute C (on inputs chosen by the lessor) from the post-measurement
state in register R2 given by σ∗R2 ∝ TrR1
[
Π1
[(
SSL.Verify(·)R1 ⊗ 1R2
)
σR1R2
]]
.
Let A denote the adversary. As in the case of copy protection, security is defined for a security
parameter λ, a distribution Dλ over circuits C from C, and for a family of distributions {DC}C∈C
over inputs to C. We formalize the security in terms of the following game:
• The lessor samples a poly(λ)-sized circuit C ← Dλ and runs SSL.Gen(1λ), followed by
SSL.Lease(sk, C) that takes as input the secret key sk and the circuit C ∈ C, and outputs a
quantum state ρC . The lessor then sends ρC (together with the circuit SSL.Eval for ρC) to
the adversary A.
• A outputs a (possibly entangled) state σ on two registers R1 and R2, and then sends the
first register R1 to the lessor.
• For verification, the lessor runs SSL.Verify on input the secret key sk, the circuit C ∈ C and
the register R1 of the state σR1R2 . If SSL.Verify accepts, the lessor outputs ok = 1 and lets
the game continue, otherwise, the lessor outputs ok = 0 and A loses.
• The lessor samples x← DC , and sends x to the adversary.
• A responds with a bit b. If b = C(x), the lessor outputs 1. Otherwise, the lessor outputs 0.
Further, we let SSLGame(λ,A, Dλ, {DC}) denote a Boolean variable that is equal to 1, if the
above security game is won, and 0 otherwise.
As in the case of full copy protection, we define the trivial winning probability, which in the
case of SSL is just the straightforward guessing probability for the answer to the challenge,
ptriv,SSLDλ,{DC}C∈C = maxb∈{0,1}
EC←DλDˆC(b), (47)
where DˆC(b) is the probability that the correct answer to a challenge sampled from DC is b.
Definition 8 (Security). A secure software leasing (SSL) scheme for a family of classical circuits
C = {Cλ}λ∈N is said to be δ-secure with respect to the ensemble D = {Dλ}λ∈N of distributions
over circuits in C, and with respect to the ensemble {DC}C∈C, where DC is a distribution over
challenge inputs to program C, if for any λ ∈ N and any QPT adversary A,
Pr[SSLGame(λ,A, Dλ, {DC}) = 1] ≤ 1− δ(λ) + negl(λ) .
If δ(λ) = 1− ptriv,SSLDλ,{DC}C∈C , we simply call the scheme secure.
We refer to D = {Dλ}λ∈N as the program ensemble, and to {DC}C∈C as the input challenge
ensemble.
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6.1 Secure software leasing for point functions
We first consider a version of the scheme for point functions in Construction 1, slightly adapted
to the syntax of secure software leasing. Then, in Section 6.3, we extend the scheme to the class
of compute-and-compare programs. Again, for simplicity, we hand the marked input y ∈ {0, 1}n
to the leasing algorithm as an input, rather than a circuit for the point function Py itself. We
also omit the procedure SSL.Gen as we do not require it in our construction.
Construction 3 (SSL scheme for point functions). Let λ be the security parameter, and let
H : {0, 1}m(λ) → {0, 1}λ and G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m(λ) be hash functions, where m(λ) ≥ λ.
Consider the following secure software leasing (SSL) scheme (SSL.Lease,SSL.Eval,SSL.Verify) for
point functions Py with marked input y ∈ {0, 1}n:
• SSL.Lease(1λ, y): Takes as input a security parameter λ and a point function Py, succinctly
specified by the marked input y (of size n)
– Set θ = G(y).
– Sample v ← {0, 1}m(λ) uniformly at random and let z = H(v).
– Output (|vθ〉 , z).
• SSL.Eval(1λ, (ρ, z);x): Takes as input a security parameter λ, a program (ρ, z), and a string
x ∈ {0, 1}n (the input on which the program is to be evaluated).
– Set θ′ = G(x).
– Apply Hadamards Hθ
′
= Hθ
′
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hθ′λ to ρ. Append n + 1 ancillary qubits, all in
state |0〉, and compute the hash function H with input ρ into the first n of them (possibly
making use of additional ancillary qubits). Then, coherently measure whether the first
n ancilla qubits are in state |z〉, recording the result in the last ancilla qubit, uncompute
the hash function H and undo the Hadamards Hθ
′
. Finally, measure the last ancilla
qubit to obtain a bit b as output.
• SSL.Verify(1λ, y, z, σ): Apply Hθ to the input state σ, where θ = G(y), and measure in the
standard basis. Output 1 if the result is v such that H(v) = z, and 0 otherwise.
The correctness property of Construction 3 according to Definition 7 is immediate to verify.
Before stating our main theorem on the security of Construction 3, we recall the following class
of distributions over point functions, which was defined in Section 4.
• DPF-UNP. The class of unpredictable point function distributions DPF-UNP consists of ensembles
D = {Dλ} where Dλ is a distribution over point functions on {0, 1}λ such that Py ← Dλ
satisfies Hmin(y) ≥ λ for some  > 0.
We also define the following class of distributions over input challenges.
• DPF-Chall-SSL. An ensemble D = {Dy}, where each Dy is a distribution over {0, 1}|y|, belongs
to the class DPF-Chall-SSL if there exists an efficiently sampleable family {Xλ} of distributions
over {0, 1}λ with Hmin(Xλ) ≥ λ, for some  > 0, such that Dy is the following distribution
(where λ = |y|):
– with probability 1/2, output y.
– with probability 1/2, sample x← Xλ, and output x.
We say the ensemble D is specified by the ensemble Xλ.
We finally define two classes of distributions over pairs of programs and challenges.
• DPF-pairs-stat-SSL. This consists of pairs of ensembles
(
D = {Dλ}, D′ = {D′y}
)
where D ∈
DPF-UNP and D′ ∈ DPF-Chall-SSL satisfying the following. Let D′ be parametrized by the
family {Xλ} (following the notation introduced above), and denote by MarkedInput(Dλ) the
distribution over marked points in {0, 1}λ induced by Dλ. Then, the families {Xλ} and
{MarkedInput(Dλ)} are statistically indistinguishable.
• DPF-pairs-comp-SSL. This is defined in the same way as DPF-pairs-stat-SSL, except that we only
require {Xλ} and {MarkedInput(Dλ)} to be computationally indistinguishable.
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Let us now conclude Section 6 with our main result on the security of Construction 3.
Theorem 5. The scheme of Construction 3, with m(λ) = poly(λ), is a secure software leasing
scheme for point functions with respect to any pair of ensembles (D,D′) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat-SSL (∈
DPF-pairs-comp-SSL), against query-bounded (computationally bounded) adversaries in the quantum
random oracle model.
Theorem 5 implies that, once a leased copy is successfully returned to the lessor, no adversary
can distinguish the marked input of a point function from a random (non-marked) input with
probability better than 1/2, except for a negligible advantage (in the parameter λ).
We give a proof of Theorem 5 in the next section.
6.2 Proof of security
To prove the theorem, we rely on a few technical results.
Lemma 21. Let α ∈ Cn and A1, . . . , An ∈ Cm×m. Then, it holds that
Tr
[ n∑
i=1
αiAi
]
≤ ‖α‖1 ·
n∑
i=1
|Tr[Ai]|.
Proof. Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
Tr
[ n∑
i=1
αiAi
]
=
n∑
i=1
αiTr
[
Ai
] ≤
√√√√ n∑
i=1
|αi|2 ·
√√√√ n∑
i=1
|Tr[Ai]|2.
The claim follows from the norm inequality ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖x‖1, for all x ∈ Cn.
Lemma 22. Let 0 ≤ Π ≤ 1 and let ρ and σ be states such that TD(ρ, σ) ≤ γ. Then,
Tr[Πρ]− γ ≤ Tr[Πσ] ≤ Tr[Πρ] + γ
Proof. By the standard identity TD(σ, ρ) = max
0≤Λ≤1
Tr[Λ(σ − ρ)], it follows that:
Tr[Πσ] = Tr[Πρ] + Tr[Π(σ − ρ)]
≤ Tr[Πρ] + max
0≤Λ≤1
Tr[Λ(σ − ρ)]
= Tr[Πρ] + TD(σ, ρ)
≤ Tr[Πρ] + γ.
The other inequality can be shown by reversing the role of ρ and σ.
Lemma 23 ([Unr15], Lemma 18). Let θ ∈ {0, 1}m and define Πeqθ =
∑
v∈{0,1}m H
θ |v〉 〈v|Hθ ⊗
Hθ |v〉 〈v|Hθ (i.e the projector that checks if two registers yield the same outcome if measured in
the Hθ basis). Then, the following is true for every t ∈ [m]. For any approximate EPR state,
|φ+ab〉 =
1√
2m
∑
v∈{0,1}m
|v〉 ⊗XaZb |v〉 ,
where a, b ∈ {0, 1}m have Hamming weight at most t, it follows that:
• Πeqθ |φ+ab〉 = |φ+ab〉 holds if and only if for all i ∈ [m]:
(θi = 0 ∧ ai = 0) ∨ (θi = 1 ∧ bi = 0).
• Πeqθ |φ+ab〉 = 0 holds for all other cases.
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We also rely on the next lemma which is based on a result by Unruh [Unr15, Lemma 15]. To
state the lemma, we define the projector onto the subspace spanned by EPR-pairs in registers XY
with up to t ∈ N single-qubit Pauli operators applied to register Y:
ΠEPRt =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
|φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab| , |φ+ab〉 =
1√
2m
∑
v∈{0,1}m
|v〉 ⊗XaZb |v〉 ,
where w(a), w(b) denote the Hamming weights of the strings a and b. Since
{ |φ+ab〉 : a, b ∈ {0, 1}m}
forms an orthogonal basis of XY, any state ρ such that
(
ΠEPRt ⊗ 1R
)
ρXYR = ρXYR on registers X,Y
and R can be written as follows (where a, b of weight greater than t have probability zero):
ρXYR =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
pab
(
|φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab|XY ⊗ σa,bR
)
, (48)
for some arbitrary states σa,b and indices a, b ∈ {0, 1}m. We show the following lemma:
Lemma 24 (Monogamy uncertainty relation). Fix a parameter t ∈ N and string θ ∈ {0, 1}m.
Let ρ be a density matrix on registers X,Y and R such that
(
ΠEPRt ⊗ 1R
)
ρXYR = ρXYR. Let
{Πv′}v′∈{0,1}m be an arbitrary complete set of orthogonal projectors on register R and measure
according to the set
{
Hθ |v〉 〈v|XHθ ⊗ 1Y ⊗Πv′R
}
v′∈{0,1}m . Then,
Pr[v′ = v] =
∑
v∈{0,1}m
Tr
[(
Hθ |v〉 〈v|XHθ ⊗ 1Y ⊗ΠvR
)
ρXYR
] ≤ 2−m(m+ 1)2t.
In other words, the min-entropy of the random variable V (with outcome v) given register R is at
least Hmin(V |R) ≥ m− 2t log(m+ 1).
Proof. For brevity, we define a family of projectors {Λθu}u acting on registers X and Y, where
Λθu =
(
Hθ |u〉 〈u|XHθ ⊗ 1Y
)
.
Let T be the set of all possible indices of weight less or equal than t. Now, using decomposition
(48), we can bound the success probability of measuring v′ = v using the information in the
ancilla register R as follows:
Pr[v′ = v] =
∑
v∈{0,1}m
Tr
[ (
Hθ |v〉 〈v|XHθ ⊗ 1Y ⊗ΠvR
)
ρXYR
]
=
∑
v∈{0,1}m
Tr
[ ∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
pab
(
Λθv |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab|XY Λθv
)
⊗
(
Πvσ
a,b
R
) ]
(by def.)
≤
∑
v∈{0,1}m
( ∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
pab
)
·
( ∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
‖Λθv |φ+ab〉 ‖2 · Tr
[
Πvσ
a,b
R
])
(Lem. 21)
=
∑
v∈{0,1}m
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
‖Hθ |v〉 〈v|XHθ ⊗ 1Y |φ+ab〉 ‖2 · Tr
[
Πvσ
a,b
R
]
(by def.)
=
∑
v∈{0,1}m
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
‖Hθ |v〉 〈v|XHθ ⊗XaZbY |φ+〉 ‖2 · Tr
[
Πvσ
a,b
R
]
=
∑
v∈{0,1}m
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
‖Hθ ⊗XaZbHθ( |v〉 〈v|X ⊗ 1Y) |φ+〉 ‖2 · Tr[Πvσa,bR ] (Lem. 1)
=
∑
v∈{0,1}m
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
Tr
[
Πvσ
a,b
R
]
2m
=
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
w(a),w(b)≤t
Tr
[
σa,bR
]
2m
=
|T |
2m
,
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where in the second-to-last step we used the completeness property that
∑
v Πv = 1, and in
the last step we use that the σa,b have unit trace, for every a, b ∈ {0, 1}m. It now suffices to bound
|T |, the number of error indices of weight less or equal to t. In total we have t indices to assign
to m+ 1 possible choices (we add an additional degree of freedom to account for when there are
no errors assigned). Since we have two independent indices a, b ∈ {0, 1}m, we get:
Pr[v′ = v] ≤ 2−m|T | ≤ 2−m(m+ 1)2t.
This proves the claim.
Let us now proceed with the security proof. We consider the following sequence of hybrids of
SSLGame. We will show that the optimal winning probability in each successive hybrid changes
at most negligibly. We will then bound the optimal winning probability in the final hybrid.
H0: This is the original game SSLGame in Section 6:
• The lessor runs SSL.Lease(1λ, y ∈ {0, 1}λ) to sample v ← {0, 1}m and θ ← G(y) ∈ {0, 1}m,
and sends (|vθ〉 , H(v)) together with a circuit for SSL.Eval to the adversary A.
• Having access to the random oracles G and H, the adversary A outputs a (possibly entan-
gled) state σ on two registers Y and R, and sends the register Y to the lessor.
• For verification, the lessor runs SSL.Verify(y,Y): Measure the register Y in the Hθ basis
according to θ = G(y). If the outcome is equal to v such that H(v) = z, the lessor outputs
ok = 1 and lets the game continue, otherwise, the lessor outputs ok = 0 and A loses.
• Conditioning on ok = 1, the lessor sends the adversary a sample x← Dy to which A responds
with a bit (we refer to this phase of the security game as the “input challenge phase”). Using
the string y given as input, the lessor outputs 1, if the bit is equal to Py(x), and 0 otherwise.
H1: The game is the same as before, except that in the input challenge phase the lessor samples
x← Dy, and sends G(x) to A, (instead of sending x directly).
H2: The game is the same as before, except for the input challenge phase. The lessor sam-
ples x← Dy. Then, if x 6= y, the lessor chooses θ′ ← {0, 1}m and sends θ′ to A (instead of G(x)).
H3: The game is the same as before, except that the lessor samples θ ← {0, 1}m (instead of
θ ← G(y)). Then, in the input challenge phase, the lessor samples x ← Dy. If x = y, the lessor
sends θ to A.
H4: The game is identical to the game before, except that we replace H(v) with a uniformly
random string z ← {0, 1}λ.
First, we show that the advantage of any adversary in H4 is negligible. Again, in the rest of
the section, we denote by p(Hi) the optimal winning probability in hybrid Hi (see the proof in
Section 4.1 for a clarification on what the expression p(Hi) means formally).
Lemma 25. p(H4) ≤ 12
Proof. First, the optimal probability of the adversary winning the game can only increase if we
remove the verification portion of the game, and the lessor directly executes the input challenge
phase.
Then, we consider the state received by the adversary in the two distinct cases of the input
challenge phase.
• The lessor samples the marked point. In this case, the state received by the adversary is the
following, which is completely independent of the oracle H:
Eθ,v
(
|vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ|
)
⊗ Ez |z〉 〈z| .
Notice that the latter state is maximally mixed.
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• The lessor samples a point other than the marked point. In this case, the adversary receives
the following state, which is again independent of the oracle:
Eθ,θ′,v
(
|vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |θ′〉 〈θ′|
)
⊗ Ez |z〉 〈z| .
The latter state is again maximally mixed.
Thus, an adversary can win the game H4 with probability at most 12 .
We will now show that the optimal success probabilities in successive hybrids do not deviate
by more than a negligible amount.
Lemma 26. |p(H1)− p(H0)| = negl(λ).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 10 in the security of our copy-protection
scheme. The intuition is that, since G is a random oracle, the pre-image x does not help the
adversary, and can be simulated.
Lemma 27. |p(H2)− p(H1)| = negl(λ).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 11, where an adversary that wins with
non-negligible difference in H2 and H1 yields a distinguisher for G(Xλ) and Um(λ).
Lemma 28. |p(H3)− p(H2)| = negl(λ).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 12, where an adversary that wins with
probabilities that differ non-negligibly in H3 and H2 yields a distinguisher for G(Xλ) and Um(λ).
The crux of the security proof is showing that p(H3) and p(H4) are negligibly close.
Lemma 29. |p(H4)− p(H3)| = negl(λ) .
The rest of the section is devoted to proving this lemma. At a high level, the proof has two
parts:
• For any adversary making q queries to the oracle, we bound the difference between the
winning probability in H3 and in H4 by poly(q) ·M , where M is a quantity related to the
probability that the adversary queries the oracle at the encoded string v.
• Then, we show that the quantity M is negligible.
Lemma 30. Let A be an adversary for H3 and H4, making poly(λ) oracle queries (pre and post
verification). Suppose that A passes the verification step with probability at least 1
2
− negl(λ) in
H3. Let A be specified by the unitary U (i.e. A alternates oracles calls with applications of U).
Let pv,θ,z,H ∈ [0, 1], and let ρv,θ,z,HR be density matrices, for all v, θ, z,H. Let
σLR = Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,H (|H〉 〈H| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|)L ⊗ ρv,θ,z,HR
be the post-verification state of the lessor and A in H4 conditioned on A passing the verification
step. Let τθ = 12 |θ〉 〈θ|+ 12Eθ′ |θ′〉 〈θ′|. Then,
|Pr[A wins in H3]− Pr[A wins in H4]| ≤ poly(λ) ·M + negl(λ) ,
where
M =
1
2
EHEvEθEzEkpv,θ,z,HTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOHv,z )k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ τθ
) (
UOHv,z )k
)† ]
+
1
2
EHEvEθEzEkpv,θ,z,HTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOH)k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ τθ
) (
UOH)k
)† ]
.
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Proof. As we have done in several earlier proofs, we can recast H3 as follows: A receives a
uniformly random z, and gets access to a the reprogrammed oracle Hv,z. Let |vθ〉 denote the
encoding of string v using basis θ. Let q1 and q2 denote the number of queries made by the
adversary respectively before and after the verification phase.
First notice that the global states of the lessor and adversary right before the verification is
executed are negligibly close in trace distance in H3 and H4.
EHEvEθEz |H〉 〈H| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗
(
(UOHv,z )q1 |vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|
(
(UOHv,z′ )q1
)†)
≈EHEvEθEz |H〉 〈H| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗
(
(UOH)q1 |vθ〉 〈vθ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|
(
(UOH)q1
)†)
. (49)
Here we have stored the complete function H in an additional register, the quantum way of
formulating indistinguishability of the joint distribution of H and the adversary’s state.
Equation (49) follows from the one-way-to-hiding lemma (Lemma 7), and the fact that A only
queries at v with negligible probability (otherwise A would straightforwardly imply an adversary
that wins the monogamy game (more precisely the variant of Lemma 4).
It follows that:
• The probabilities of A passing the verification step in H3 and in H4 are negligibly close.
• The post-verification states, conditioned on passing verification must be negligibly close (this
uses (49) together with the fact that, by hypothesis, A passes verification with probability
at least 1
2
− negl(λ)).
By definition, the joint state of lessor and adversary post-verification state in H4 conditioned
on A passing verification is
σLR = Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,H (|H〉 〈H| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|)L ⊗ ρv,θ,z,HR .
Let the analogous state in H3 be
σ˜LR = Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,H (|H〉 〈H| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z|)L ⊗ ρ˜v,θ,z,HR .
Then σL,R ≈ σ˜L,R. Now, denote by {Π0,Π1} the projective measurement performed by A to
guess the answer to the input challenge phase. Then,
Pr[A wins in H4|verification is passed]
= Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,H
[
1
2
Tr
[
Π1(UOH)q2ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ|
(
(UOH)q2
)† ]
+
1
2
Eθ′Tr
[
Π0(UOH)q2ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ′〉 〈θ′|
(
(UOH)q2
)† ]]
. (50)
And, similarly,
Pr[A wins in H3|verification is passed]
= Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,H
[
1
2
Tr
[
Π1(UOHv,z )q2 ρ˜v,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ|
(
(UOHv,z )q2
)† ]
+
1
2
Eθ′Tr
[
Π0(UOHv,z )q2 ρ˜v,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ′〉 〈θ′|
(
(UOHv,z )q2
)† ]]
≈ Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,H
[
1
2
Tr
[
Π1(UOHv,z )q2ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ|
(
(UOHv,z )q2
)† ]
+
1
2
Eθ′Tr
[
Π0(UOHv,z )q2ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ′〉 〈θ′|
(
(UOHv,z )q2
)† ]]
. (51)
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Using equations (50) and (51), and applying the O2H lemma twice (once to bound the distance
between the first terms in expressions (50) and (51), and once to bound the distance between the
second terms in (50) and (51)), we obtain:
|Pr[A wins in H4|verification is passed]− Pr[A wins in H3|verification is passed]|
≤ poly(λ) · 1
2
Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,HTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOH)k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ|
) (
UOH)k
)† ]
+ poly(λ) · 1
2
Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,HTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOHv,z )k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ|
) (
UOHv,z )k
)† ]
+ poly(λ) · 1
2
Ev,θ,z,H,θ′ pv,θ,z,HTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOH)k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ′〉 〈θ′|
) (
UOH)k
)† ]
+ poly(λ) · 1
2
Ev,θ,z,H,θ′ pv,θ,z,HTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOHv,z )k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ |θ′〉 〈θ′|
) (
UOHv,z )k
)† ]
+ negl(λ)
= poly(λ) · 1
2
Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,HTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOH)k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ τθ
) (
UOH)k
)† ]
+ poly(λ) · 1
2
Ev,θ,z,H pv,θ,z,HTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOHv,z )k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ τθ
) (
UOHv,z )k
)† ]
+ negl(λ)
= poly(λ) ·M + negl(λ) , (52)
where to get two equalities we used the definition of τθ and M . This is the desired bound.
In the rest of the section, we show that the quantity M from Lemma 30 is negligible. First of
all, notice that M is negligible if and only if the second term in M is negligible, i.e. if and only if,
EHEvEθEzEkpv,θTr
[
|v〉 〈v| (UOH)k
(
ρv,θ,z,HR ⊗ τθ
) (
UOH)k
)† ]
= negl(λ) . (53)
where we are using the same notation as in Lemma 30. Thus, what we wish to show is equivalent
to showing that, for any adversary A in H4 who passes verification with probability at least
1
2
− negl(λ), the probability of querying the oracle at the encoded string v at any point after a
successful verification is negligible.
Thus, we will show that (53) is negligible. First, notice that an adversary A which passes
verification in H4 with probability at least 12 − negl(λ) and violates (53) immediately implies an
adversary which succeeds at the following game H˜0 with non-negligible probability.
H˜0: This is identical to H4 except we ask the adversary to return a guess
v′ for the encoded string v, instead of a bit. A wins if v′ = v.
The reduction crucially uses the hypothesis that A passes verification with probability at least
1
2
−negl(λ). We will show through another sequence of hybrids (which we denote using tildes) that
the optimal winning probability in H˜0 is negligible. This will complete the proof that the quantity
in (53), and thus M is negligible, for any adversary A who passes verification with probability at
least 1
2
− negl(λ). Since the optimal winning probability in H3 and H4 is at least 12 (the honest
strategy followed by random guessing achieves 1
2
), this concludes the proof of Lemma 29, and
hence that the optimal winning probability in H0 is at most 12 + negl(λ). The following are the
hybrids.
H˜1: Instead of sampling v ← {0, 1}m and θ ← {0, 1}m at the beginning of the game, the lessor
now prepares an EPR pair on two registers X and Y, and sends the registers YZ of the state
|φ+〉XY ⊗ |z〉Z to A. Rather than running SSL.Verify for verification and measuring the register Y,
the lessor now measures both registers X and Y in the Hθ basis for a random θ ← {0, 1}m, and
checks if the outcomes result in the same string, which we denote by v.
H˜2: This game is identical to the one before, except that we change the verification procedure
as follows. Instead of measuring each of the registers X and Y in the Hθ basis, the lessor now
measures a bipartite projector Πeqθ in order to check if the registers XY yield the same outcome if
measured in the Hθ basis. We define the projector as follows:
Πeqθ =
∑
v∈{0,1}m
Hθ |v〉 〈v|XHθ ⊗Hθ |v〉 〈v|YHθ.
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Afterwards, the lessor measures register X in the Hθ basis to determine v.
We will denote these hybrids using a tilde to distinguish them from the original sequence of
hybrids.
Lemma 31. p(H˜1) = p(H˜0).
Proof. The argument is fairly standard. We consider the following two statements:
• sample v ← {0, 1}m, let θ ∈ {0, 1}m, and output ⊗mi=1 |vθii 〉Y.
• create an m-qubit EPR pair |φ+〉XY, measure X in the Hθ basis, and output register Y.
It is evident that the equivalence of the two statements implies that p(H˜1) and p(H˜0) are identical.
Note that we omit the register |z〉 in the proof, since it is independent of the EPR registers and
thus does not affect the argument. Consider the following family of projectors given by
{(Hθ |v〉 〈v|Hθ ⊗ 1Y)}v∈{0,1}m .
We analyze the post-measurement state |ψv〉 /
√〈ψv |ψv〉, for |ψv〉 = (Hθ |v〉 〈v|XHθ ⊗ 1Y) |φ+〉:
|ψv〉XY =
(
Hθ |v〉 〈v|Hθ ⊗ 1) |φ+〉XY
=
((
Hθ ⊗ 1)( |v〉 〈v| ⊗ 1)(Hθ ⊗ 1)) |φ+〉XY
=
((
Hθ ⊗ 1)( |v〉 〈v| ⊗ 1)(1⊗Hθ)) |φ+〉XY (Lemma 1)
= 2−m/2
∑
v′∈{0,1}m
((
Hθ ⊗ 1)( |v〉 〈v| ⊗ 1)(1⊗Hθ)) |v′〉X ⊗ |v′〉Y
= 2−m/2
∑
v′∈{0,1}m
Hθ |v〉X
〈
v
∣∣ v′〉⊗Hθ |v′〉Y
= 2−m/2Hθ |v〉X ⊗Hθ |v〉Y .
This proves the claim, since the Y register of |ψv〉 /
√〈ψv |ψv〉 is identical to ⊗mi=1 |vθii 〉.
Lemma 32. p(H˜2) = p(H˜1)
Proof. The lemma is immediate as the measurement in H˜2 is a coarse-graining of the measurement
in H˜1, with the acceptance condition remaining the same.
In the remaining part of the proof, we will show that p(H˜2) is negligible. The following is an
important technical lemma, which is inspired by Lemma 16 and Lemma 19 in [Unr15].
Lemma 33. p(H˜2) = negl(λ) .
Proof. Let A be an adversary for H˜2. Denote by v′ the final guess returned by the adversary, and
by v the encoded string. Let ok be a random variable for whether the verification passes. Then,
the winning probability of A in H˜2 is given by:
Pr
[
v′ = v ∧ ok = 1] .
We show that, for any t ∈ [m],
Pr
[
v′ = v ∧ ok = 1] ≤ 2−m(m+ 1)2t + 2−t−12 . (54)
Picking t ≈ √m then gives the desired result, as the RHS becomes negligible in λ.
Fix a basis choice θ ∈ {0, 1}m. Let ρθ be the state on registers X,Y and R in H˜2 after the
verification, where R is the leftover register held onto by A that also includes the challenge τθ
(where τθ was defined in Lemma 30) sent by the lessor after verification.
In the analysis that follows, it is convenient to approximate ρθ by an ideal state that is diagonal
in a basis for the image of ΠEPRt ⊗ 1R, where ΠEPRt is as defined in Lemma 24. Recall that ΠEPRt
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projects onto the subspace spanned by EPR pairs with up to t Pauli errors, i.e. onto the space
spanned by the orthogonal basis states
{ |φ+ab〉 : a, b ∈ {0, 1}m}, where
|φ+ab〉 =
1√
2m
∑
v∈{0,1}m
|v〉 ⊗XaZb |v〉 . (55)
We can use Lemma 3 to argue that there exists such an ideal state ρidθ , and that the trace distance
between the two states satisfies:
TD(ρθ, ρ
id
θ ) ≤
√
1− Tr[(ΠEPRt ⊗ 1R) ρθ] .
We can represent the adversary’s strategy in guessing v, after verification, by a projective
measurement {Πv′}v′ .
We are now ready to bound the probability Pr
[
v′ = v ∧ ok = 1]. Let Θ be a random variable
for the basis choice made by the lessor. Then, by marginalizing over Θ, we get:
Pr
[
v′ = v ∧ ok = 1] = ∑
θ∈{0,1}m
2−m · Pr [v′ = v| ok = 1 ∧ Θ = θ] · Pr[ok = 1|Θ = θ]
≤
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
2−m · Pr [v′ = v| ok = 1 ∧ Θ = θ]
= Eθ Pr[v′ = v | ok = 1 ∧ Θ = θ]. (56)
Fix any θ. Using Lemma 22 and Lemma 24 we obtain:
Pr
[
v′ = v | ok = 1 ∧Θ = θ] ≤ 2−m(m+ 1)2t + TD(ρθ, ρidθ )
≤ 2−m(m+ 1)2t +
√
1− Tr[(ΠEPRt ⊗ 1R) ρθ] . (57)
Now, averaging over θ in the above inequality gives:
Eθ Pr[v′ = v | ok = 1 ∧Θ = θ] ≤ 2−m(m+ 1)2t + Eθ
√
1− Tr[(ΠEPRt ⊗ 1R) ρθ]
≤ 2−m(m+ 1)2t +
√
EθTr
[((
1−ΠEPRt
)⊗ 1R) ρθ] . (58)
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. We will proceed to bound the above
term EθTr
[((
1−ΠEPRt
)⊗ 1R) ρθ] by 2−t−1. Let us first show that for any a, b ∈ {0, 1}m:
pab
def
=
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
2−mTr
[(
1−ΠEPRt
)
Πeqθ |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab|XY
] ≤ 2−t−1. (59)
This follows from considering the following two cases:
• w(a), w(b) ≤ t: Using Lemma 23 we find that one of the following is true. Depending on
θ, either Πeqθ |φ+ab〉 = 0 or Πeqθ |φ+ab〉 = |φ+ab〉. We also get that
(
1 − ΠEPRt
) |φ+ab〉 = 0, since
ΠEPRt |φ+ab〉 = |φ+ab〉, and thus it follows that pab = 0.
• max (w(a), w(b)) ≥ t + 1: Here, Lemma 23 implies that there are at most 2m/2t+1 many
values of θ for which it holds that Πeqθ |φ+ab〉 6= 0, and thus pab ≤ 2−m · 2m/2t+1 = 2−t−1.
Observe now that ΠEPRt and |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab| are diagonal in the Bell basis, hence they commute.
Lemma 23 implies that the same is also true for the projector Πeqθ . For any fixed θ ∈ {0, 1}m, we
express ρθ as a generic density operator on registers X, Y and R such that, for a finite index set
Iθ, coefficients qij and an orthogonal basis {|Ψi,θ〉 : i ∈ Iθ} the registers X and Y:
ρθ =
∑
i,j∈Iθ
qij |Ψi,θ〉 〈Ψj,θ|XY ⊗ σi,j,θR , (60)
where σi,j,θ are matrices for indices i, j ∈ Iθ. Since we assumed that ρθ is the state conditioned
on the verification being successful for some θ, we have the property that(
Πeqθ ⊗ 1R
)
ρθ
(
Πeqθ ⊗ 1R
)
= ρθ, ∀θ ∈ {0, 1}m. (61)
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In other words, ρθ on is invariant under the action of the projector Πeqθ ⊗ 1R. Then,
EθTr
[(
1−ΠEPRt
)⊗ 1R ρθ]
=
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
2−mTr
[(
1−ΠEPRt
)⊗ 1R ρθ]
=
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
2−mTr
[(
1−ΠEPRt
)⊗ 1R (Πeqθ ⊗ 1R)ρθ(Πeqθ ⊗ 1R)] (Eq. (61))
=
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
2−mTr
[((
1−ΠEPRt
)
Πeqθ ⊗ 1R
)
ρθ
]
=
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
2−mTr
[( ∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
|φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab|
)(
1−ΠEPRt
)
Πeqθ ⊗ 1R ρθ
]
=
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
2−m Tr
[
|φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab|
(
1−ΠEPRt
)
Πeqθ ⊗ 1R ρθ
]
=
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
2−m Tr
[(
1−ΠEPRt
)
Πeqθ ⊗ 1R
( |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab| ⊗ 1R)ρθ( |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab| ⊗ 1R)]
In the third to last line, we inserted the complete set
∑
a,b |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab| = 1. Then, using the
definition of ρ in Eq.(60), we can continue to expand the expression above as follows:∑
θ∈{0,1}m
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
2−m Tr
[(
1−ΠEPRt
)
Πeqθ ⊗ 1R
( |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab| ⊗ 1R)ρθ( |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab| ⊗ 1R)]
=
∑
θ∈{0,1}m
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
2−m
∑
i,j∈Iθ
qij Tr
[(
1−ΠEPRt
)
Πeqθ |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab|
( |Ψi,θ〉 〈Ψj,θ|XY ) |φ+ab〉 〈φ+ab| ⊗ σi,j,θR ]
=
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
∑
i,j∈Iθ
pab qij 〈φ+ab|
( |Ψi,θ〉 〈Ψj,θ|XY ) |φ+ab〉 Tr[σi,j,θR ] (by def.)
≤ 2−t−1
∑
i,j∈Iθ
qij
∑
a,b∈{0,1}m
〈φ+ab|
( |Ψi,θ〉 〈Ψj,θ|XY ) |φ+ab〉 Tr[σi,j,θR ] (Eq. (59))
= 2−t−1
∑
i,j∈Iθ
qijTr
[ |Ψi,θ〉 〈Ψj,θ|XY ]Tr[σi,j,θR ] = 2−t−1 Tr[ρθ] = 2−t−1.
In the last line, we used that
{ |φ+ab〉 : a, b ∈ {0, 1}m} is an orthogonal basis for XY. Thus, we get
EθTr
[(
1−ΠEPRt
)⊗ 1R ρθ] ≤ 2−t−1.
Plugging this bound in (58) and then into (56) gives
Pr
[
v′ = v ∧ ok = 1] ≤ 2−m(m+ 1)2t + 2−t−12 . (62)
Choosing t ≈ √m makes the RHS negligible.
Corollary 5. p(H˜0) = negl(λ).
As we argued earlier, this concludes the proof of Lemma (29), and thus of Theorem 5.
6.3 Extension to compute-and-compare programs
In this section, we show that an SSL scheme for point functions, which is secure with respect to the
appropriate program and challenge ensembles, implies an SSL scheme for compute-and-compare
programs with the same level of security, with respect to apppropriate program and challenge
ensembles. The idea is the same as in Section 5: to lease the compute-and-compare program
CC[f, y], we first lease the point function Py, and then hand out the function f in the clear.
Let (SSL-PF.Gen, SSL-PF.Lease,SSL-PF.Eval, SSL-PF.Verify) be any SSL scheme for point func-
tions. The compute-and-compare program scheme is defined as follows:
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Construction 4 (SSL scheme for compute-and-compare programs). The SSL scheme for compute-
and-compare programs (SSL-CC.Gen, SSL-CC.Lease, SSL-CC.Eval,SSL-CC.Verify) is defined by:
• SSL-CC.Gen(1λ): Takes as input the security parameter λ. Then,
– Let sk← SSL-PF.Gen(1λ). Output sk.
• SSL-CC.Lease(1λ, sk, (f, y)): Takes as input a security parameter λ, a secret key sk, and a
compute-and-compare program CC[f, y], specified succinctly by f and y. Then,
– Let ρ = SSL-PF.Lease(1λ, sk, y)). Output (f, ρ).
• SSL-CC.Eval(1λ, (f, ρ);x): Takes as input a security parameter λ, an alleged program copy
(f, ρ), and a string x ∈ {0, 1}n (where n is the size of the inputs to f). Then,
– Compute y′ = f(x).
– Let b← SSL-PF.Eval(ρ; y′). Output b.
• SSL-CC.Verify(1λ, sk, (f, ρ);σ):
– Let b′ ← SSL-PF.Verify(1λ, sk, y;σ). Output b′.
Recall the definition of the class of distributions over compute-and-compare programs DCC-UNP
in Section 5. We recall it here for convenience.
• DCC-UNP. We refer to this class as the class of unpredictable compute-and-compare programs.
This consists of ensembles D = {Dλ} where Dλ is a distribution over compute-and-compare
programs such that CC[f, y] ← Dλ satisfies Hmin(y|f) ≥ λ for some  > 0, and where the
input length of f is λ and the output length is bounded by some polynomial t(λ).
We also define the following class of distributions over input challenges:
• DCC-Chall-SSL. An ensemble D = {Df,y}, where each Df,y is a distribution over the domain
of f , belongs to the class DCC-Chall-SSL if there exists an efficiently sampleable family {Xλ} of
distributions over {0, 1}λ with Hmin(Xλ) ≥ λ, for some  > 0, and an efficiently sampleable
family {Zf,y}, where Zf,y is a distribution over the set f−1(y), such that Df,y is the following
distribution (where λ is the size of inputs to f):
– with probability 1/2, sample z ← Zf,y and output z.
– with probability 1/2, sample x← Xλ, and output x.
We say the ensemble D is specified by the families {Xλ} and {Zf,y}.
Similarly to Section 5, we also define two classes of distributions over pairs of programs and
challenges for compute-and-compare programs.
• DCC-pairs-stat-SSL. This consists of pairs of ensembles
(
D = {Dλ}, D′ = {D′f,y}
)
where D ∈
DCC-UNP and D′ ∈ DCC-Chall-SSL satisfying the following. Let D′ be specified by the fami-
lies {Xλ} and {Zf,y}, and denote by MarkedInput (Dλ, {Zf,y}) the distribution over {0, 1}λ
induced by Dλ and {Zf,y}, i.e.:
– Sample (f, y)← Dλ, then output z ← Zf,y.
For any fixed f∗ with domain {0, 1}λ such that (f∗, y∗) is in the support of Dλ for some y∗,
denote byMarkedInput(Dλ, {Zf,y})|f∗ , the distributionMarkedInput(Dλ, {Zf,y}) conditioned
onDλ sampling f∗. Then, we require that, for any sequence {f (λ)∗ } (where, for all λ, (f (λ)∗ , y∗)
is in the support of Dλ for some y∗) the families {Xλ} and {MarkedInput(Dλ, {Zf,y})|f(λ)∗ }
are statistically indistinguishable.
• DCC-pairs-comp-SSL. This is defined in the same way as DCC-pairs-stat-SSL, except that we only
require {Xλ} and {MarkedInput(Dλ, {Zf,y})|f(λ)∗ } to be computationally indistinguishable.
Theorem 6. Let (SSL-PF.Gen, SSL-PF.Lease, SSL-PF.Eval, SSL-PF.Verify) be an SSL scheme for
point functions that is δ-secure with respect to all pairs (D,D′) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat-SSL (∈ DPF-pairs-comp-SSL).
Then, the scheme of Construction 4 is a δ-secure SSL scheme for compute-and-compare programs
with respect to all pairs (D,D′) ∈ DCC-pairs-stat-SSL (∈ DCC-pairs-comp-SSL). The same conclusion holds
relative to any oracle, i.e. when all algorithms have access to the same oracle, with respect to
query-bounded (computationally bounded) adversaries.
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The proof of Theorem 6 uses a similar reduction to the point function security game as in the
copy-protection variant in Theorem 4. The main difference is that the reduction between the SSL
games now involves a verification step. We add the proof for completeness.
Proof of Theorem 6. We prove the claim for ({Dλ}, {Df,y}) ∈ DCC-pairs-stat-SSL only, since the case
of ({Dλ}, {Df,y}) ∈ DCC-pairs-comp-SSL is virtually identical. Let t(λ) be the length of strings in
the range of f ’s sampled from Dλ and let the ensemble {Df,y} be specified by {Xλ} and {Zf,y}
(using the notation introduced above for ensembles in DCC-Chall-SSL).
LetA be an adversary for the compute-and-compare SSL scheme of Construction 4 with respect
to ensembles {Dλ} and {Df,y} who wins at the SSL security game with probability p(λ) > 0. It
then follows that for each λ there exists f (λ)∗ such that (f
(λ)
∗ , y) is in the support of Dλ for some
y, and such that the probability that A wins is at least p(λ), conditioned on f (λ)∗ being sampled.
We will construct an adversary A′ that wins with probability p(λ)− negl(λ) in the point function
security game with respect to the distributions {D′t(λ)} and {D′y}, defined as follows:
• D′t(λ): sample x← Xλ and output the point function Pf(λ)∗ (x).
• D′y: sample x← Df(λ)∗ ,y and output f
(λ)
∗ (x).
The adversary A′ against the point function SSL game acts as follows:
• A′ receives a state ρ from the lessor, and then forwards (f (λ)∗ , ρ) to adversary A.
• A returns a supposed program copy σ for the point function to A′ who then sends it back
to the lessor for verification.
• Conditioning on the verification being successful, the lessor replies with a challenge input
x← D′y. A′ then samples x′ ← Zf,x, and runs A with input challenge x′.
• Let b be the bit returned by A. The adversary A′ replies with the same b to the lessor.
It is straightforward to check that the game “simulated” by A′ for A is statistically indistin-
guishable from a security game with respect to {Dλ} and {Df,y}, conditioned on f (λ)∗ . Thus, we
deduce, by hypothesis, that A passes verification and returns the correct bit with probability at
least p(λ) − negl(λ), and thus A′ wins with probability at least p(λ) − negl(λ). Crucially, note
that
({D′t(λ)}, {D′y}) ∈ DPF-pairs-stat-SSL. It follows that if the SSL is δ-secure, then the compute-
and-compare scheme must also be δ-secure.
The proof of the theorem statement relative to any oracle is analogous.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. For any x ∈ {0, 1}λ, define V Hx =
(
UOH(I − |x〉 〈x|))q and let WHx = UOH − V Hx . Then,
1
2
EHEx←X‖Π0(UOH)q (|H(x)〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEz←{0,1}m‖Π1(UOH)q (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
=
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π0(UOHx,z )q (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEz←{0,1}m‖Π1(UOH)q (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
=
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π0(V Hx,zx +WHx,zx ) (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π1(V Hx +WHx ) (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
≤1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π0V Hx,zx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π1V Hx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
+
1
2
(3q + 2)q EHEx←XEz←{0,1}mEk‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOHx,z )k |z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉 ‖
+
1
2
(3q + 2)q EHEx←XEz←{0,1}mEk‖ |x〉 〈x| (UOH)k |z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉 ‖
=
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π0V Hx,zx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π1V Hx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
+(3q + 2)qM (63)
where the first equality uses Lemma 5, and the inequality uses Lemma 18 in [BL19].
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In order to prove the desired inequality, it is sufficient to show that
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π0V Hx,zx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π1V Hx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 ≤ 1
2
.
(64)
Notice that V Hx,zx = V Hx , since V Hx projects onto the subspace orthogonal to x before every query
to H. This implies that the LHS simplifies as
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π0V Hx,zx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π1V Hx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
=
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π0V Hx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2 + 1
2
EHEx∈XEz←{0,1}m‖Π1V Hx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
=
1
2
EHEx∈XEz←{0,1}m‖V Hx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
≤1
2
, (65)
where to get the third line, we used the fact that Π0,Π1 are a complete pair of orthogonal
projectors, and to get the last line we exploited properties of the Euclidean norm.
Combining (63) and (65) gives the desired inequality.
With a little extra work, one can show that M is negligible if and only if
1
2
EHEx←XEz←{0,1}m‖Π1V Hx (|z〉 ⊗ |ψx〉) ‖2
is negligible. We refer the reader to the proof of Theorem 3 in [AHU19] for the full details.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 10
We continue the proof of Lemma 10, using the notation we introduced in the main text. In what
follows, P, F1, F2 always have access to a uniformly random oracle H, but we omit writing this.
We have
Pr[(P ′,F ′1,F ′2) win H1]
=
1
3
Pr
[
F
Gˆx′1,w1
1 (A, x
′
1) = 0 ∧ F
Gˆx′2,w2
2 (B, x
′
2) = 0
: AB← ρ, ρ← PGˆ
(
|vG(y)〉 , H(v)
)
, Py ← Dy, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
w1, w2 ← {0, 1}m(λ), x′1, x′2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ)) , Gˆ← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
+
1
3
Pr
[
F
Gˆx′1,w1
1 (A, x
′
1) = 1 ∧ F
Gˆx′2,w2
2 (B, x
′
2) = 0
: AB← ρ, ρ← PGˆ
(
|vG(y)〉 , H(v)
)
, Py ← Dy, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
w1 ← G(y), w2 ← {0, 1}m(λ), x′1, x′2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ)) , Gˆ← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
+
1
3
Pr
[
F
Gˆx′1,w1
1 (A, x
′
1) = 0 ∧ F
Gˆx′2,w2
2 (B, x
′
2) = 1
: AB← ρ, ρ← PGˆ
(
|vG(y)〉 , H(v)
)
, Py ← Dy, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
w1 ← {0, 1}m(λ), w2 ← G(y), x′1, x′2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ)) , Gˆ← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
.
(66)
For the next step, the key observation is that P only queries the oracle at x′1 and x′2 with negligible
weight. Likewise, F1 only queries x′2 with negligible weight, and F2 only queries x′1 with negligible
weight. The reason why this is true in this case is that, if it were true, P could be used to construct
an adversary that guesses a string sampled from Xλ with non-negligible probability. But Xλ has
polynomial min-entropy. Thus, by an application of the one-way-to-hiding lemma, one can replace
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the current oracle accesses of P, F1 and F2 with oracle access to the function Gˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2).
Hence, we have, up to negligible quantities,
(66) =
1
3
Pr
[
F
Gˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
1 (A, x
′
1) = 0 ∧ F
Gˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
2 (B, x
′
2) = 0
: AB← ρ, ρ← PGˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
(
|vG(y)〉 , H(v)
)
, Py ← Dy, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
w1, w2 ← {0, 1}m(λ), x′1, x′2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ)) , Gˆ← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
+
1
3
Pr
[
F
Gˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
1 (A, x
′
1) = 1 ∧ F
Gˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
2 (B, x
′
2) = 0
: AB← ρ, ρ← PGˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
(
|vw1〉 , H(v)
)
, y ← {0, 1}λ, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
w1 ← G(y), w2 ← {0, 1}m(λ), x′1, x′2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ)) , Gˆ← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
+
1
3
Pr
[
F
Gˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
1 (A, x
′
1) = 0 ∧ F
Gˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
2 (B, x
′
2) = 1
: AB← ρ, ρ← PGˆ(x′1,w1),(x′2,w2)
(
|vw2〉 , H(v)
)
, Py ← Dy, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
w1 ← {0, 1}m(λ), w2 ← G(y), x′1, x′2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ)) , Gˆ← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
(67)
For the second and third terms, it is convenient to further reprogram the oracle Gˆ at y,
assigning as output a fresh uniformly random value in {0, 1}m(λ). We can do this since none of
the algorithms queries at y with non-negligible weight. In this way, we are able to rewrite (67)
more concisely, up to negligible terms, as:
1
3
Pr
[
FG1 (A, x′1) = 0 ∧ FG2 (B, x′2) = 0
: AB← ρ, ρ← PG
(
|vG(y)〉 , H(v)
)
, Py ← Dy, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
x′1, x
′
2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
+
1
3
Pr
[
FG1 (A, x′1) = 1 ∧ FG2 (B, x′2) = 0
: AB← ρ, ρ← PG
(
|vG(x′1)〉 , H(v)
)
, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
x′1, x
′
2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
+
1
3
Pr
[
FG1 (A, x′1) = 1 ∧ FG2 (B, x′2) = 0
: AB← ρ, ρ← PG
(
|vG(x′2)〉 , H(v)
)
, v ← {0, 1}m(λ),
x′1, x
′
2 ← Xλ , G← Bool(n,m(λ))
]
(68)
Finally, notice that
(68) =
1
3
Pr(P,F1,F2) win H0| 0-input, 0-input]
+
1
3
Pr(P,F1,F2) win H0| 1-input, 0-input]
+
1
3
Pr(P,F1,F2) win H0| 0-input, 1-input]
= p , (69)
which yields the desired result.
48
